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The Theory, Reality and Pragmatism
of Corporate Governance in
Bankruptcy Reorganizations
by
Christopher W. Frost*
Governing a corporation during a Chapter 11 reorganization presents a
special case of the age-old problem of the separation of ownership and con-
trol.1 Critics of Chapter 11 have long pointed to the insulation provided by
the automatic stay to managers of the business as one of the causes of bank-
ruptcy inefficiency.2 Protected from the normal contractual and market
forces that restrain the behavior of managers of healthy companies, managers
of firms in bankruptcy, the harshest critics charge, use delay and other strate-
gies to enrich themselves and the shareholders at the expense of the firm's
creditors.
These charges echo those leveled in corporate law debates about the re-
sponsiveness of managers to the concerns of shareholders 3 and, more recently,
about the behavior of corporate managers of companies involved in leveraged
buyouts.4 Disputes over the constituencies that managers should serve and
*Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law, B.B.A. 1983, J.D. 1986, University of Ken-
tucky. Copyright 1997. All rights reserved. I thank Cynthia Woolverton, Saint Louis University School
of Law, Class of 1998, for her able assistance in the preparation of this Article. I also thank Paula Colman
for her insights into the problems addressed here.
1The phrase "separation of ownership and control" was coined by Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means
in their classic work, ADOLPH A. BERLE, J. & GARDINER C. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 4 (1932).
2See, eg., Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE LJ.
1043, 1076 (1992) (Filing a Chapter 11 petition, in effect, is a way to keep control of the firm free from
the intrusive monitoring of creditors, thereby permitting management to extract wealth from the firm's
various security holders.").
3See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85
COLUM. L. REv. 1403, 1407 (1985) (To be sure, there is room to debate the extent to which manage-
ment engages in such diversion or shirking; but there is no doubt that the structural arrangements under
which management is selected and governed permit it to do both more than trivially."). Classic articles
examining this problem from an economic perspective include Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Sepa-
ration of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & ECON. 301 (1983), and Michael C. Jensen & William F.
Meckling, Theory of the Firn: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 305 (1976).
4See, eg., William W. Bratton, Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring,
1989 DuKE LJ. 92, 165-70 (1989); John C. Coffee, Jr, The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate
Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1618, 1662-64 (1989); Frank H. Easterbrook &
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the efficacy of such institutional controls as fiduciary duties, contract, and the
market in controlling managers' behavior continue unabated, resulting in a
rich literature of corporate governance that accounts for a wide range of
views. Drawing from this literature, many bankruptcy scholars have turned
their attention to the unique corporate governance problems that Chapter 11
raises.5 By examining the economic principles underlying the nonbankruptcy
governance structure, these commentators have propounded theories that
seek to align the Chapter 11 governance structure with its nonbankruptcy
counterpart.
As compelling as such theories may seem outside of bankruptcy, they
tend to fall apart in the context of a Chapter 11 case. The financial reverses
precipitating the filing, the need to attend to the day-to-day business
problems, and the desire for a speedy and inexpensive resolution of the
problems often render the bankruptcy governance structure ineffective, re-
sulting in a free-for-all in which strategic behavior is the order of the day.
This specter is more likely in small bankruptcies where the creditors have so
little at stake that the traditional methods of control-creditors' committees,
motions to convert to Chapter 7 or to appoint a Chapter 11 trustee, termina-
tion of debtor exclusivity, and the like-are impractical. In many cases, there
is no one with the time and the incentive to assure that managers are not
milking the case for their own benefit.
Bankruptcy lawyers and judges are a pragmatic lot, however. Status con-
ferences, expedited procedures in small bankruptcies, the judicious use of ex-
aminers and, perhaps most importantly, control over the fees awarded to
debtors' attorneys are pragmatic responses to the difficulties inherent in gov-
erning a corporation undergoing a Chapter 11 reorganization. In addition,
the recent report of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission 6 includes
practical recommendations that are intended to reduce the managerial auton-
omy that has plagued small business cases.
Further complicating questions of bankruptcy governance, however, is
the fact that governance questions are inextricably bound up in the broader
Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv.
L. REv. 1161, 1168-73 (1981).
5See, e.g., Edward S. Adams, Governance in Chapter 11 Reorganizations: Reducing Costs, Improving
Results, 73 B.U. L. REv. 581 (1993); Christopher W. Frost, Running the Asylum Governance Problems in
Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 34 Aiuz. L. REv. 89, 91-94 (1992); Thomas G. Kelch, Shareholder Control
Rights in Bankruptcy: Disassembling the Withering Mirage of Corporate Democracy, 52 MD. L. Rev. 264
(1993); Thomas G. Kelch, The Phantom Fiduciary: The Debtor in Possession in Chapter 11, 38 WAYNE L.
REv. 1323 (1992); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 669 (1993); David Arthur Skeel, Jr,
The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. Rev. 461
(1992).
6
See NAT'L BANKR. REv. COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NExr TwErrrY YEARs (1997) [hereinafter
NBRC REPORT]. The NBRC Report is available via the Internet at <hattp://www.nbrc.gov>.
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policy question of what goals Chapter 11 should seek to promote. Leaving
managers in control of reorganizing businesses not only benefits the managers
and the shareholders, it may also provide indirect benefits to such noninves-
tor constituencies as employees, customers, suppliers, and the surrounding
community. To the extent the Chapter 11 process introduces delay in the
ultimate liquidation of businesses without a realistic chance of reorganization,
the benefits are shared by these stakeholders. Thus a governance system that
errs in favor of attempting reorganization may be justifiable as a means
through which redistributions from creditors to these stakeholders might be
effected.
We are far from a consensus on the appropriate goals underlying Chapter
11. In general, we seem to expect that the process of rehabilitation will serve
both the goals of maximizing the value of the business assets, thereby maxi-
mizing creditors' returns, and restoring businesses to health so that they can
continue to provide benefits to employees and other noninvestor stakehold-
ers. The problem is that meeting both of these goals is impossible when
liquidation is the choice that maximizes the value of the business assets. This
conflict, coupled with the usual lack of clarity regarding the likelihood that
the business does have a positive going concern value, forces us to choose
between a governance system that is biased in favor of liquidation and one
that is biased in favor of reorganization.
This Article addresses the financial economic theories of corporate gov-
ernance and isolates some of the principles underlying the nonbankruptcy
corporate governance structure that bear on the problem of corporate gov-
ernance in Chapter 11. Having established those theories as a basis for dis-
cussion, the Article then examines the practical limitations on the bankruptcy
process resulting from creditor indifference and a lack of consensus regarding
the goals of Chapter 11. The Article next examines some of the ways courts
have responded to the intractable problems of running a Chapter 11 debtor,
focusing on courts' use of case management techniques, examiners, and con-
trol over attorneys' fees. The Article concludes with a discussion of the Na-
tional Bankruptcy Review Commission's Report and Recommendations,
discussing both the Commission's practical governance recommendations and
the Report's evidence of a continued tension over the appropriate goals of
Chapter 11.
I. THE THEORY OF BANKRUPTCY GOVERNANCE
In its broadest sense, the term 'corporate governance refers to the regu-
lation of decisionmaking within the firm. Economic theory views the corpo-
ration as the central party to a set of contracts among providers of inputs to
1998)
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production.7 Corporate managers monitor compliance with these contracts
and make decisions that fall within the inevitable gaps in the contracts.8
Thus at this high level of generality, the basic principle of corporate govern-
ance is simply that managers control most of the decisions that are not the
subject of explicit contract. 9
It is here that the analysis starts to get interesting. Managers monitor
the contractual relationships that comprise the firm, but they themselves are
in a contract relationship with the firm and, therefore, must themselves be
monitored.' 0 This observation raises two fundamental questions. First, who
is in the best position to monitor managers-that is, for whom do managers
work? Second, how should that group accomplish and enforce its monitoring
role? Passing familiarity with corporate law provides the commonplace an-
swers. Managers owe their allegiance to the shareholders of the firm who
effectuate their monitoring through their right to remove managers and
through their enforcement of managers' fiduciary duties. This Part examines
the reasons underlying these two propositions and then looks at the effect the
bankruptcy process has on those rationales.
A. THE NONBANKRUPTCY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE
The nonbankruptcy corporate governance structure is designed to resolve
conflicts between the participants in the firm. The most basic of these con-
flicts arise from the differences in incentives that emerge once a corporation
divides the claims to its assets between debt and equity. Issuing debt divides
the claims on earnings and assets between fixed and residual claimants. Cred-
itors trade a claim to the business' upside potential for a fixed, priority claim
on the assets and the income stream. After the interest rate on the debt is
fixed, creditors prefer that the corporation avoid projects that increase the
risk of the income stream since they bear some of the risk of failure but re-
ceive none of the higher returns. Shareholders, on the other hand, prefer
projects that increase the risk of the corporation because they will capture all
of the higher returns and are protected on the downside by the limited liabil-
ity doctrine."
7The seminal paper on this 'nexis of contracts" theory is Jensen & Meckling, supra note 3.
'If parties could account for all contingencies in their contracts, there would be no need for discretion.
It is because contracting is costly that managers must exercise discretion over some corporate decisions.
See Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE LJ. 1197, 1199 (1984) (CMatters would be vastly
simplified if firms were small and if contracts between the corporation and each of its constituencies
satisfied the paradigm of contracting within discrete markets, where each exchange can accurately be
described as 'sharp in by clear agreement; sharp out by clear performance").
9See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1996); REv. MODEL Bus. CoiP. AcT. §§ 8.01, 8.25 (1984).
1 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Governance, 18 HARv. J.L. & PUB. Poi.y 671,
676-77 (1995).
nSee Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. CoRP. L. 205, 225-30 (1988) (provid-
ing an excellent summary of the literature discussing this phenomenon).
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Managers play a central role in the mediation of this conflict. Their con-
trol over the selection of business projects enables them to choose between
satisfying the shareholders' appetite for risk and observing the creditors' dis-
taste for such projects. The nonbankruptcy corporate governance structure
is designed to provide a mixture of contractual, market and fiduciary con-
straints on managers' choices. The following discussion examines this struc-
ture and the economic principles supporting it in an effort to illuminate the
tensions and principles underlying the bankruptcy governance structure.
1. Managerial Allegiance
The differences in their respective claims on corporate income create in-
herent conflicts between creditors and shareholders. Thus, the question of
managerial allegiance is of more than theoretical interest. The existing law
provides an allocation of control and allegiance that forms the backdrop
against which participants in capital markets develop expectations and nego-
tiate contracts. As a general rule creditors derive their protection against
managerial and shareholder opportunism solely through contract. Sharehold-
ers have protections that are less specific but occasionally more powerful
than those granted the creditors.12
Historically, the allocation of control rights is most likely due to the dif-
ferences in the legal source of claims of shareholders and creditors. Charac-
terized as the true owners of the corporate enterprise, shareholders lay claim
to the equitable principles that underlie trust law.13 Since credit claims arise
from contract, there is little room for a fiduciary analysis. Economic analysis
of the firm provides an alternative explanation that better illuminates the
special problems involved in translating general principles of corporate gov-
ernance into the bankruptcy forum.
In the solvent corporation the allocation to shareholders of control rights
and managerial allegiance is justified by the status of shareholders as the
residual claimants on the corporation's cash flow. So long as the corporation
is solvent, business decisions made by managers directly affect the income of
the shareholders. Shareholders stand to gain or lose depending on the efficacy
12This allocation of control rights has been the subject of substantial scholarly criticism. Commenta-
tors have questioned the wisdom of the shareholder wealth maximization principle that underlies the rules
that direct managers to resolve conflicts between the interests of shareholders and creditors in favor of the
shareholders. See Bratton, supra note 4, at 149-151; Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr, Corporate Fiduciary Prin-
ciples for the Post.Contractarian Era, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. Rav. 561, 599-606 (1996); McDaniel, supra note
11, at 265-309.
13See Harvey R Miller, Corporate Governance in Chapter 11: The Fiduciary Relationship Between
Directors and Stockholders of Solvent And Insolvent Corporations, 23 SEToN HALL L. Rav. 1467, 1473
(1993) (-Tbis relationship of trust between directors and the corporation and its stockholders 'springs
from the fact that directors have the control and guidance of corporate business affairs and property and
hence of the property interests of the stockholders") (quoting Ashman v. Miller, 101 F.2d 85, 91 (6th Cir.
1939)).
1998)
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of the managers. Thus, shareholders stand in the best economic position to
monitor the decisions of managers. They have the most to gain or lose by
managerial decisions.
14
The beauty of this simple explanation of the managerial allegiance aspect
of corporate governance is that it also provides an explanation of ways in
which managerial allegiance shifts when the corporation becomes insolvent.
In a growing number of cases, courts hold that managerial allegiance must
shift to the creditors when the corporation approaches insolvency.15 Upon
insolvency, the residual claims of the shareholders become economically
worthless.' 6 Creditors who will go unpaid in the event of complete financial
failure now occupy the position of residual owners. Thus, it is not surprising
that managerial allegiance should depend upon the fortunes of the business.
2. Enforcement of Control Rights
Of course, it is one thing to require managers to pursue the business of
the firm for the benefit of the shareholders but quite another to put such a
guiding principle into practice. Again, passing familiarity with corporate law
provides the commonplace methods of enforcing managers allegiance to the
shareholders. Shareholders may enforce managers' fiduciary duties through
derivative suits and retain the ability to oust managers through voting rights.
But, while shareholder voting rights and fiduciary duties may constrain mana-
gerial behavior in the most egregious circumstances, these methods are un-
likely to be effective in completely assuring managerial allegiance. In
addition, these methods are inadequate to assure creditors that managers will
not take actions that result in insolvency of the firm. To get a complete
vision of the governance structure, therefore, one has to further examine the
role of contract and the market in policing managers and mediating conflicts
between creditors and shareholders.
The limitations of the fiduciary duty principle as a method of policing
managerial misconduct are well known. The principle subsumes two related
axioms. First, managers owe shareholders a duty of undivided loyalty. The
duty of loyalty assures shareholders that managers will exercise their discre-
1
4
See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R- FISCHEL, THE EcoNoMIc STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW 67-70 (1991) (discussing the importance of residual claims in corporate governance).
UTwo recent cases from the Delaware courts make clear that the fiduciary duties of managers extend
to creditors when the corporation becomes insolvent or approaches insolvency. See Geyer v. Ingersoll
Publications Co., 621 A.2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992); Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commu-
nications Corp, No. Civ. A. 12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). The implications of this
extension of fiduciary duties outside of the bankruptcy context are explored in Remesh K.S. Rao et al,
Fiduciary Duty a la Lyonnais: An Economic Perspective on Corporate Governance in a Financially Dis-
tressed Finn, 22 IowA J. CoRP. L. 53 (1996), and Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinting a Corporation's Obliga.
tions to Creditors, 17 CARuozo L. Rnv. 647 (1996).
'6Although the bankruptcy system may provide shareholders with holdup value. See infra notes 76-81
and accompanying text.
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tion free from the taint of self dealing. Second, managers owe shareholders a
duty of care and diligence. In theory, these axioms should be sufficient to
enforce shareholders' expectations of managerial allegiance. In practice, how-
ever, the business judgment rule limits the efficacy of the fiduciary duty prin-
ciple in all but the most obvious cases of conflict.17
The limitations on the fiduciary duty principle relegate it to a secondary
role in the corporate governance structure-effective in checking only the
most egregious conflicts and management failures. Thus, the nonbankruptcy
governance structure places relatively more reliance on the shareholders' con-
tractual right to remove managers. Voting rights operate as the basic govern-
ance mechanism by giving shareholders the ability to replace managers who,
through miscalculation, bad judgment, or shirking, have failed to maximize the
value of the firm.' 8 Again, however, shareholder voting rights may provide
less than complete protection against managerial misbehavior. This is partic-
ularly problematic in large firms. The wide dispersion of shares necessitated
by investors' desire for diversification 19 often results in individual sharehold-
ers having too little at stake to justify their monitoring managers to assure
that they are doing a good job. This, coupled with managerial control over
the proxy apparatus, enables managers to control the outcome of corporate
elections.2
o
This problem leaves the market as the ultimate backstop against the limi-
tations inherent in the fiduciary principle and shareholder voting rights.
Given that the difficulty with voting rights is the wide dispersion of share-
holders with each holding small claims, transactions that aggregate voting
power in the hands of larger investors provide a remedy.2' This is the typical
justification for the merger and acquisition activity that became so rampant
in the 1980s. 2
2
As noted above, when a corporation is solvent, creditors do not enjoy a
17See Alan R. Palmiter, Reshaping the Corporate Fiduciary Model: A Director's Duty of Independence,
67 TEx. L. REv. 1351, 1361-62 (1989) (Courts accord near-complete deference to corporate decisions
untainted by interest"). Easterbrook and Fisachel provide an explanation of the business judgment rule
that highlights the likelihood that a negligence standard would result in managerial risk aversion that
would be inconsistent with the goal of shareholder wealth maximization. EASTERBROOK & FIsOHEL, supra
note 14, at 98-100.
"'Easterbrook and Fischel characterize shareholder voting rights as the second most distinctive feature
(after limited liability) of corporate law. EASTEBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 14, at 63.
'9See John C. Coffee, Jr, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH.
L. Rav. 1, 17-20 (1986).
'See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kaban, A Frareworkfor Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy
Contests, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1071, 1079-82 (1990).
2 1See EASTERBROOK & FisCHEL, supra note 14, at 113-14; Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market
for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. EcoN. 110 (1965).
22See Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence and Regulation, 9 YA J. oN REo.
119, 129-31 (1992).
1998)
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claim to managerial allegiance enforced through the fiduciary duty principle
or through voting rights. 23 Creditors do, however, need protection against
actions that decrease the creditworthiness of their borrower.24 Thus, a com-
plete view of corporate governance must consider the contractual limitations
on managerial conduct that are inherent in the firm's credit relationships.25
Consider first the firm's long-term credit relationships. Such relationships are
governed by contracts that often provide detailed protection against specific
managerial actions that unduly increase the risk of the enterprise. These cov-
enants strike a negotiated balance in the creditor/shareholder conflict. Ac-
tions that violate the covenants result in default and a consequent
withdrawal of capital from the firm. In the absence of bankruptcy, such a
withdrawal of capital would likely result in the replacement of the
managers.
26
Short-term lenders may also exercise a form of control over the behavior
of managers. While short-term credit contracts do not usually contain the
detailed covenants characteristic of longer term debt, the revolving nature of
these arrangements can be a significant constraint. Managers who take ac-
tions that unduly increase the risk of the business may find their sources of
short-term credit drying up, which in turn can result in a cash flow crisis that
triggers defaults in other credit arrangements.
3. Summary: An Integrated Corporate Governance Structure
As illustrated above, corporate governance is accomplished through a
complex but integrated structure of contract, market and fiduciary principles.
Each element of the structure complements the others, resulting in a system
that attempts to mediate conflict between shareholders and creditors and
that binds managers to behave in the interests of the stakeholders. The cor-
porate governance system is also sensitive to the financial condition of the
firm. During solvency, the system vests discretionary authority in managers
and relegates creditors to the position of contracting parties. As the corpora-
tion begins to approach insolvency, the creditors' contractual controls be-
come effective to grant them a larger voice in the management of the firm.
Finally, when the firm reaches insolvency, creditors' contracts grant them
more direct authority over managers and corporate law requires managers to
shift their allegiance from the shareholders to the creditors.
2 Creditors may be granted voting rights, see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 221 (1996), so this is more
a matter of practice than an immutable corporate law rule.
24See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 12, at 599-606.
25See George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance,
83 CAL. L. REv. 1073 (1995).
261d. at 1084-85.
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B. TRANSLATING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES TO THE
BANKRUPTCY FORUM
In theory, general principles of corporate governance should work well in
the bankruptcy context. Both inside and outside of Chapter 11, governance
issues present the basic problem of how to regulate the behavior of managers
who might have an incentive to take actions that are not in the best interest
of their constituents. This requires some method of determining who those
constituents are and a system to bind the managers to pursue the interests of
those constituents. Abstracting from the sense of urgency and heightened
emotions of the participants, the basic decisions confronted in a bankruptcy
case are not all that different from decisions encountered in running a solvent
corporation. While some components of the nonbankruptcy system require
adjustment to accommodate the particular needs of a collective judicial pro-
ceeding, the basic theory remains applicable inside bankruptcy.
1. Evaluating Business Decisions in Chapter 11
Governance in the reorganization context requires a decisionmaking
structure capable of handling problems ranging from the mundane day-to-day
decisions involved in running a firm to the basic liquidation/reorganization
decisions that lie at the very heart of a Chapter 11 case. While the Code
provides detailed standards for reaching such decisions, at bottom, these deci-
sions should be judged by the standard applicable to all businesses. Most
business analysts agree that the quality of decisions, big or small, is a function
of the expected cost of the decision compared to the present value of the
expected return from that decision. At first blush, this proposition appears
unremarkable and unlikely to be particularly controversial. On further exam-
ination, however, the proposition raises two important points about business
decisionmaking generally and its applicability to the reorganization context.
The first of these points is the fact that our general standard for business
decisions says absolutely nothing about who should reap the gains or bear the
losses of the decision. Thus, this standard adopts the goal of allocative effi-
ciency which does not account for the distributional consequences of a partic-
ular decision. Thus, to the extent one sees the purpose of the reorganization
process as the maximization of the value of the business assets,2 7 the fact that
a decision is being made in the bankruptcy context is irrelevant. All that
insolvency does is change the beneficiaries of business decisions.
The second of these points is that decisions can be evaluated only on the
basis of expected costs and expected returns. Business decisions of all sorts
entail possibilities of gain and risks of loss. The fact that a loss instead of a
27The effect of the relaxation of this assumption is considered infra notes 71-82 and accompanying
1998)
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gain materialized in a given case does not mean that the decision resulting in
that loss was, at the time the decision was made, objectively wrong.28 Per-
haps more importantly, decisions made both inside and outside of bankruptcy
involve such a wide array of competing possibilities and probabilities that it
makes little sense to discuss business decisions in terms of their "correctness."
Instead, the focus must be on the process through which such decisions are
made-the governance structure. This proposition underlies the business
judgment rule.29 Courts recognizing the complexity of business decisions and
their inherently subjective qualities require nothing more than that the deci-
sionmaker be free of obvious conflict 30 and be well informed about the conse-
quences of the decision.31
2. Adjusting the Governance Structure to Account for the Special
Needs of the Bankruptcy Process
Of course, one cannot simply apply the nonbankruptcy governance struc-
ture in bankruptcy cases. The automatic stay and the need to deter strategic
uses of the structure in an effort to achieve favorable treatment require that
the structure be adjusted to account for the particular needs of the reorgani-
zation process. The automatic stay32 deprives creditors of their contractual
controls over managers by prohibiting them from withdrawing capital from
the business. Shareholder meetings called in an effort to displace managers
who are thought to have failed to adequately protect shareholder interests
must be scrutinized closely to assure that they are not simply delay tactics.33
Market discipline is not likely to be of much use. Markets for the securities
of small bankrupt firms are likely to be thin. Even in those situations in
2
8See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 14, at 98 (To observe that things turned out poorly ex
post, perhaps because of competitors' reactions, or regulations, or changes in interest rates or consumers
fickleness, is not to know that the decision was wrong ex ante.").29Id. at 98-100. See also Palmiter, supra note 17, at 1373.301d. at 1361.
3 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
3211 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994).
33See Manville Corp. v. Equity Sec. Holders Comm. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 52 B.R. 879 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 60 B.R. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd, 801 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1986), on remand, 66 B.R.
517 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986). In Manville, the bankruptcy court issued an injunction prohibiting a share-
holders' meeting at the instance of the debtor's management and several creditor constituencies. The
bankruptcy court found that the express purpose of the meeting would be to replace the existing board
with one that would be more sympathetic to shareholders' interests. The district court affirmed, but the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, stating that enjoining the meeting would require a
showing that the equity committee was acting in bad faith by showing a "willingness to risk rehabilitation
altogether in order to win a larger share for equity." 801 F.2d at 65. The court did, however, note that if
Manville were insolvent, "denial of the right to call a meeting would likely be proper.. ." Id. at 65, n.6.
On remand, the bankruptcy court supplemented its findings to include the required showing and again
entered the injunction. 66 B.L at 542. The Manville case, as well as other cases addressing this issue, are
thoroughly discussed in Michael A. Gerber, The Election of Directors and Chapter 11: The Second Circuit
Tells Stockholders to Walk Softly and Carry a Big Lever, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 295, 321-41 (1987).
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which an active market exists, managers are unlikely to respond to the mar-
ket when they are fighting for the very existence of the business.
This leaves the fiduciary principle as the sole surviving element of the
nonbankruptcy corporate governance structure. Courts often note that the
debtor in possession is a fiduciary. Moreover, because the corporation is usu-
ally insolvent in bankruptcy, that fiduciary duty extends to the creditors of
the business. But, as noted above, the fiduciary principle works only as a
backstop to the contractual and market components of the nonbankruptcy
governance structure. The difficulty in evaluating business decisions leads
courts to abstain from directly examining the quality of business decisions.
Instead, outside of bankruptcy, the fiduciary principle is limited to an exami-
nation of obvious conflicts and egregious failures on the part of managers.
Thus, the fiduciary principle alone cannot be expected to provide an answer
to the difficult problems involved in governing a bankrupt entity.34
The Chapter 11 process is not without its own governance structure,
however. The judicial controls over the entire process provide a replacement
for the contractual and market controls that exist outside of Chapter 11.
The court's authority to appoint a trustee,35 end debtor exclusivity,36 or con-
vert or dismiss37 a case can all be thought of as elements of the reorganization
governance structure. In addition, the Code requires judicial approval of spe-
cific managerial decisions that can have the effect of prolonging or shortening
the case.38 Creditor committees39 supplement this structure by assuring that
widely dispersed creditors have a representative with enough at stake to jus-
tify the costs of monitoring the debtor and participating in bankruptcy
decisionmaking.40
While this governance structure is facially complete, it provides a less
than satisfactory substitute for the contract and market controls that are
eliminated by the filing of a bankruptcy petition.41 Outside of bankruptcy,
34The business judgment standard governs the court's review of managements decisions in bankruptcy
as well. See Frost, supra note 5, at 120. The fiduciary principle is further limited as a tool of bankruptcy
governance by the fact that managers' duties run to both the creditors and to the shareholders. See infra
notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
3511 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1994).
36 d. § 1121(c).
37Id. § 1112(b).
3
l1d. § 363(b). Elsewhere I have analyzed the limitations of these elements of the bankruptcy govern-
ance structure. See Frost, supra note 5, at 120-29.
3911 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) requires the appointment of a creditors' committee in every case. In practice,
however, creditors' committees are appointed in only about fifteen percent of all cases. See NBRC RP,
PORT, supra note 6, at 642 (citing ExEcuTva OFFICE OF U.S. TRusTEES, SUMMARY BY CIRcurr OF
CREDrroR Cmmn-rEE DATA (1996) [hereinafter CREDITOR CommrrrEE DATA]).
4°These collective action problems are similar to those facing shareholders in large, publicly held firms.
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
4'Dissatisfaction with the bankruptcy governance structure is at the heart of the many calls for reform
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managers are beholden to a group of claimants that has actual money at stake
in the business decision under consideration. This economic incentive is non-
existent in a Chapter 11 since the ultimate decisionmaker is the bankruptcy
judge.42 In addition, the bankruptcy judge can only act on information and
transactions that are presented to her. Managers' informational advantages
coupled with their control over the initiation of business decisions may allow
them to manipulate the decisionmaking apparatus to their benefit.
43
But, by incorporating the economic principles underlying the nonban-
kruptcy governance structure, we can improve the performance of the reor-
ganization process. Elsewhere I have suggested one potential solution.44
When evaluating a particular decision, bankruptcy judges should attempt to
discover the views of the group that stands at the margin of solvency-the
economic residual claimants. This approach recognizes the fact that insol-
vency shifts the residual interest in business decisions from the shareholders
to the creditors and is therefore consistent with nonbankruptcy decisions
that extend fiduciary duties to creditors when the company approaches insol-
vency. This economic shift in the residual interest places creditors in the
of Chapter 11. Much of the reform literature seems to be concerned with managers' use of the inadequate
controls over them to prolong the bankruptcy case, benefitting shareholders and themselves at the expense
of creditors. Many of these reform proposals call for market resolutions to the problems of financial
distress in an effort to preclude this type of behavior. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political
Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REv. 311 (1993); Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and
Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 439 (1992); Philippe Aghion et al, The Economics of Bankruptcy
Reform, 8 J. L. EcoN. & ORG. 523 (1992); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganiza-
tions, 15 J. LEGAL. STUD. 127 (1986); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganiza-
twns, 101 HARv. L. REv. 775 (1988); Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2; Robert K Rasmussen,
Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 Tx. L. REv. 51 (1992); Mark J. Roe,
Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. Rev. 527 (1983); David
A. Skeel, Jr., Rethining the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 Tm L. REv. 471
(1994).
It seems fairly clear that these proposals are unlikely to garner support, however. Thus, the challenge
is to work within the existing structure in an effort to improve corporate governance in Chapter 11.
Several commentators have suggested ways in which the general principles of corporate governance might
be further incorporated in Chapter 11 to improve results in Chapter 11. See authorities cited supra note
5.
42In the words of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit:
[S]elf interest concentrates the mind, and people who must back their beliefs
with their purses are more likely to assess ... value... accurately than are people
who simply seek to make an argument. Astute investors survive in competition;
those who do not understand the value of assets are pushed aside. There is no
similar process of natural selection among expert witnesses and bankruptcy judges.
In re Central Ice Cream Co, 836 F.2d 1068, 1072-73 n.3 (7th Cir. 1987).
43See Barry L. Zaretsky, Trustees and Examiners in Chapter 11, 44 S.C. L. Rev. 907, 914 (1993)
('Although the Code requires that a court approve various business decisions made by the debtor-in-
possession, the debtor maintains the ability to determine, to a considerable extent, which issues are placed
before the court.").
44See Frost, supra note 5, at 135-38.
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position of gaining or losing from the business decision. From a process per-
spective, this group of investors is likely to hold the correct incentives to
make decisions that maximize the value of the corporation's assets.
This solution is subject to a conceptual difficulty. The accurate use of
this method requires an answer to the very question that bankruptcy re-
solves-the value of the business assets. If the value of the business assets
were readily ascertainable, there would be no need for a judicially supervised
reorganization process. New claims to the assets could be generated automat-
ically by an application of the absolute priority rule. It is therefore the vagar-
ies of business valuation that create the need for the reorganization process.45
This problem presents an insurmountable obstacle to the full realization
of such a theoretically neat solution. But residual claim analysis may still
provide a means through which we can improve bankruptcy decisionmaking.
Even in cases in which valuation difficulties preclude a precise location of the
residual claimants, bankruptcy judges may be able to identify claimants that
certainly are not residual claimants. For example, in cases in which the cor-
poration is hopelessly insolvent, the judge may discount the claims of share-
holders who have nothing at stake in the decision under consideration.
Similarly, in evaluating the views of a senior creditor secured by collateral
with a liquidation value far in excess of the creditor's claim, the bankruptcy
judge should pay little heed to arguments that the business decision at issue
should be decided in a way that would shorten the case. Thus, while residual
claim analysis cannot provide a clear rule of decision, it can be used to evalu-
ate competing positions. Rather than simply ask whether a proposed busi-
ness decision is correct, this approach asks the judge to take account of the
incentives of those advocating or contesting the decision.46
3. An Example of Residual Claim Analysis: Litigation Settlements
One category of cases that courts occasionally examine under this rubric
consists of cases in which the principal asset of the estate is a lawsuit. The
Seventh Circuit opinion in In re Central Ice Cream Co.47 provides the best
example. In Central Ice Cream, the court considered three appeals regarding
the district court's decisions on sanctions and attorneys' fees. The heart of
the case was the trustee's handling of a suit by the debtor against McDon-
ald's Corp. Central Ice Cream had won a $52 million verdict against Mc-
Donald's. Pending the trial court's decision on the verdict, McDonald's
offered Central Ice Cream $15.5 million to settle the case. The bankruptcy
45Id. at 137. Note also that valuation probably also requires an evaluation of the business decision
itself leading to circularity in the decisionmaking process.
46Id.
47836 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1987).
1998)
116 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL
judge approved this settlement over the objection of the shareholders.48
After attorneys' fees, the settlement provided more than enough money
to pay all of Central Ice Cream's creditors. The bankruptcy court approved
the settlement stating, "To seek greater return for the shareholders at risk to
the creditors would be most unfair."49 While not called upon to overturn the
bankruptcy court's approval of the settlement, Judge Easterbrook's opinion
seemed to differ with the bankruptcy court regarding the appropriate resolu-
tion of the conflict:
Central Ice Cream had assets sufficient to pay all creditors.
This made the shareholders the residual claimants; each addi-
tional dollar would go to them. It is true, as the bankruptcy
judge wrote, that spurning the settlement would expose the
creditors to risk, but this parallels the risk creditors face
outside of the bankruptcy process as firms try to maximize
the expected value of the enterprise. 50
The court also noted that, while creditors outside of bankruptcy are not enti-
tled to challenge the corporation's decisions, inside of bankruptcy they may
do so because "they are (presumed to be) the principally affected persons, the
new residual claimants."5'
The Central Ice Cream case is unusual, not only because the court pre-
sumed that the debtor was solvent, but also because the court so explicitly
adopted an analysis focusing on the desires of the residual claimants. Other
courts have considered settlement offers using a similar analysis, however. In
In re Bowman,52 for example, a Chapter 7 debtor sought to convert her53 case
to a Chapter 11 so that she could pursue litigation that the Chapter 7 trustee
proposed to settle. The $500,000 settlement offer was sufficient to cover
nondischargeable tax claims but was likely insufficient to provide a distribu-
tion to the debtor.54 The court noted that the evaluation of a settlement
offer in the context of an insolvent Chapter 7 estate is straightforward be-
cause the creditors take precedence. In a Chapter 11 case, or in a case in
which there is a potential that the estate is solvent, however, the court
45The true status of the objecting parties was an issue in the case. The court noted that these ob-
jecting parties held more than 300 percent of the common stock of the debtor. Id. at 1069.
49Id. at 1070 (quoting In re Central Ice Cream Co., 59 B.R. 476, 487 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985)).
'Id. at 1072.
.'id. at 1073.
52181 B.R. 836 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995).
53The fact that Bowman involved an individual debtor does not change the analysis. In this situation,
the debtor occupies a role similar to that of a shareholder of a corporate debtor. In a subsequent opinion,
the court rejected the debtor's claim that the suit was exempt. In re Bowman, No. 91-5-2533-SD, 1996
Bankr. LEXIS 925, 78 A.F.T.R.2d 96-5890 (Bankr. D. Md. July 11, 1996).
54181 B.R. at 840.
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stated that the evaluation becomes more difficult.55
In making this more difficult analysis, the court adopted the approach of
the bankruptcy court in the Central Ice Cream case without discussing Judge
Easterbrook's analysis. The court stated:
If creditors could be paid to a certainty, regardless of the
outcome of litigation, there might be a strong argument for a
debtor to proceed. In the instant case, however, there is no
guaranty, just a potential for a larger sum of money that will
only benefit the Debtor. The creditors do not benefit from
pursuing the litigation further, although they have the most
of the risk. The creditors may receive less than they would
with the settlement, but there is no chance that they would
receive more than they are owed. It would distort the bank-
ruptcy process to permit the Debtor to shift the risk of loss
to the creditors while retaining all the potential benefit for
herself, particularly over the objections of creditors.
5 6
Thus, the court in Bowman, like the bankruptcy court in Central Ice Cream,
was unwilling to find that the continued pursuit of the litigation would not
place creditor recoveries at risk.
In re Speilfogel_7 involved another individual debtor, this time in Chapter
11. The Chapter 11 trustee proposed to enter into a global settlement to
which the debtor objected. The court distinguished Bowman stating that
that case involved an insolvent debtor in a Chapter 7.58 Instead, citing the
Seventh Circuit opinion in Central Ice Cream, the court searched the record
for some indication that the trustee had considered the interests of the debtor
in the residuary interest in the settlement. Finding no such consideration, the
court proceeded to "balance the equities7 rejecting the settlement because
"The Court believes that if the litigation proceeds, the creditors will ulti-
mately receive a substantial portion, if not 100%, of their claims, whereas if
the settlement is approved, the Debtor will receive nothing and lose any pos-
551d. at 844.
56
1d. The court also considered the ability of Bowman as debtor in possession to act as a fiduciary for
the estate, concluding that the conflict between her interests and the interests of her creditors could not
be reconciled. Id. at 845. Accordingly, the court granted the debtors motion to convert but immediately
granted the motion of the IRS to reconvert the case to Chapter 7. The court also authorized the trustee
to accept the settlement. Id. at 846-48.
57211 B.R 133 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997).
581d. at 144-45. This reading of the Bowman opinion arguably renders it consistent with the Seventh
Circuit's opinion in Central Ice Cream, but the reading is contestable. The Bowman court made no specific
finding that the debtor was insolvent. Instead, the court simply noted that the settlement would result in
a substantial payment to the creditors and that, while success in the litigation might result in a recovery
for the debtor, all of the risk of loss would be borne by the creditors. 181 B.R. at 844.
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sibility of a residual distribution."5 9
Both Bowman and the bankruptcy court's opinion in Central Ice Cream
illustrate both the residual claim analysis and the limitations of that approach.
In both cases, the continued prosecution of the litigation would not only
potentially benefit the stockholders, but also would expose creditors to a risk
of loss. The results in those cases show a sensitivity to the fact that the
stockholders might not truly be the residual claimants. The question of who
occupies that position turns on an analysis of the position of the creditors in
the worst case scenario. If the debtor's rejection of the settlement creates a
nontrivial chance of creditor losses, the process must account for their views.
Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Central Ice Cream recognized the difficult
valuation problems that inhere in his approach but suggested an alternative
approach to the problem. The opinion suggests that the risk to the creditors
could be eliminated by putting the firm up for sale with a $15.5 million re-
serve price. If the settlement amount were less than the expected value of
rejecting the settlement, the market (or perhaps the objecting shareholders)
would recognize the value and would bid more than the settlement amount.60
4. Summary: An Integrated Bankruptcy Governance Structure
Because the bankruptcy process addresses the unique problems arising
from financial disaster, the nonbankruptcy governance structure cannot sim-
ply be transferred into the bankruptcy context. Nonetheless, Chapter 11 sets
out its own structure that, when supplemented by the residual claim ap-
proach to decisionmaking, appears calculated to achieve results that would be
obtained outside of bankruptcy. This integrated structure replaces the
nonbankruptcy contractual and market controls over managerial behavior
with creditor representation and judicial oversight. Creditors' committees
composed of large claimants and represented by counsel and other profession-
als, have both the wherewithal and the incentive to monitor managerial be-
havior. The Code's requirement that managers obtain judicial approval of
significant transactions and the Code provisions allowing the court to ap-
point a trustee or examiner, or to convert or dismiss a case, provide ample
opportunities to test managerial competence and loyalty.
Of course, the bankruptcy governance process generates controversies.
Creditors' committees may not be fully representative of the broad array of
their constituents. Managers and members of creditors' committees may take
actions that violate their fiduciary duties to estates and their members. The
point here is not that the process is self-executing and inevitably correct, but
instead that the process seems calculated to isolate such problems and to
respond to them in a rational way.
59211 B.R. at 146-47.
'In re Central Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068, 1072 n.3 (7th Cir. 1987).
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II. THE REALITY OF BANKRUPTCY GOVERNANCE
Unfortunately, this well-intentioned and theoretically complete approach
to governance in Chapter 11 unravels in many (perhaps most) cases. One of
the principal culprits in this unraveling is the collective action problem facing
widely dispersed creditors each holding small claims. Because small creditors
have so little at stake in the bankruptcy process, they often adopt a posture
of rational indifference toward the debtor, its management, and the bank-
ruptcy case. Another problem which is easy to overlook is the possibility
that a strict application of the bankruptcy governance structure may conflict
with perceived normative commitments that underlie the Bankruptcy Code.
This section addresses these two practical limitations on the ability of the
bankruptcy governance structure to police adequately the behavior of manag-
ers of the debtor.
A. CREDITOR INDIFFERENCE
Recent studies of large Chapter 11 cases have provided some cause for
optimism that the governance structure established by the Code actually
works to police management behavior. Several studies of large cases have
provided evidence that bank creditors often are successful in ousting incum-
bent management. 6 ' In the most detailed of these studies, Professors LoPucki
and Whitford concluded that the management's loyalty to creditors or share-
holders was "clearly a function of the company's solvency. The managements
of solvent companies never aligned with creditors, while the managements of
insolvent companies did so frequently."62 Thus, while Chapter 11 may not
provide the best and cheapest means of governing an insolvent firm, one can-
not say that managers are universally well entrenched.
In contrast, the few studies of small business bankruptcies tell a tale of
virtual management autonomy. 63 In his 1983 study of small business bank-
ruptcies, Professor LoPucki concluded that "the debtors studied were able to
continue in complete control of their businesses while they were under the
jurisdiction of the court."64 This problem is exacerbated by the fact that in
terms of numbers of cases, small cases far outweigh the cases involving large,
publicly held debtors,65 and the fact that the vast majority of such cases do
61See Stuart C. Gilson & Michael R_ Vetsuypens, Creditor Control in Financially Distressed Firms:
Empirical Evidence, 72 WAsH. U. L.Q. 1005, 1011-15 (1994) (summarizing recent studies).62LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 5, at 751.
63Jerome R. Kerkman, The Debtor in Full Control: A Case for Adoption of the Trustee System, 70
MARq. L. Ray. 159 (1987); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control - Systems Failure Under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?-First Installment, 57 AM. BANu .J. 99 (1983) [hereinafter
Debtor in Full Control I]; Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control: Systems Failure Under Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code?-Second Installment, 57 AM. BANKu LJ. 247 (1983).
4LoPucki, Debtor in Full Control I, supra note 63, at 120-21.
6sSee NBRC RmORT, supra note 6, at 632 (concluding that defining small business bankruptcies as
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not result in a confirmed plan.66
One of the difficulties with small business bankruptcies is that the proce-
dures set out in Chapter 11 are too costly and cumbersome to provide an
effective reorganization framework for these cases.67 While the governance
difficulties encountered in these cases may to some extent be related to this
problem, there is another important element that distinguishes small from
large Chapter 11 cases. In small cases, creditors are unlikely to have an inter-
est in closely monitoring managers.68 The size of their claims and the remote
chance that they will receive anything close to a full payout on their claims
limit individual creditors' incentives to take an active interest in the case.69
In the vast majority of cases it is difficult to find creditors with enough at
stake in the case to be willing to serve on a creditors' committee. Studies
indicate that creditors' committees are formed only in around fifteen percent
of all Chapter 11 cases.70
This lack of creditor participation leaves the course of the reorganization
to the debtor's management and to the secured creditors (if any). The views
of the vast middle-who are likely to occupy the position of the residual
claimants in the case-are likely to be effectively silenced in the process. In
cases in which there is no significant secured creditor, the lack of a committee
creates the conditions necessary for managerial entrenchment and delay.
involving debtors with debts of less than $5,000,000 would include within that definition eighty-five
percent of all of the Chapter 11 cases filed).
'eSee id. at 610-11 (citing studies that indicate that as few as ten to twelve percent of all Chapter 11
cases result in an effective reorganization).
67 d. at 614-15 (quoting Hon. Alexander L. Paskay & Frances Pilaro Wolstenholme, Chapter 11: A
Growing Cash Cow: Some Thoughts on How to Rein in the System, 1 Am. BA mr. INST. L. REv. 331, 345-
46 (1993) ('It takes no elaborate empirical study to justify the conclusion that the problems facing a
publicly held corporation facing a mass-tort problem, are quite removed from a "mom-pop" corporation
running a shoe repair shop ... Y)).
6 The court in In re Bayou Self, Inc., 73 B.R 682 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1987), recognized this problem in
the following passage:
In most Chapter 1 cases, particularly the smaller ones, creditors, particularly un-
secured creditors, are inactive. The debtor's obligations are so spread among a mul-
titude of creditors that frequently no creditor, or creditors' committee if there is
one, has a sufficient stake to pursue its interests. Yet, the creditors collectively over
a number of cases can sustain substantial and needless losses if measures are not
taken to insure that prompt efforts are taken to rehabilitate the debtor, if possible.
Id. at 684.
69In addition, unsecured creditors likely recognize that the benefits of any special interest that they
take in the case will have to be shared with other unsecured creditors. This creates a classic free-rider
problem that results in inadequate monitoring of managements actions. See Skeel, supra note 5, at 520-22.
7
°See NBRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 642 (citing CREDrrOR COMMITTEE DATA, supra note 39).
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B. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN BANKRUPTCY POLICY
AND GOVERNANCE
Apart from the cases involving claim settlement, there has been no trend
in the reported decisions to adopt a residual claim approach to governance
questions in Chapter 11. Of course, that does not mean that courts are insen-
sitive to the solvency or lack thereof in the cases that they confront. There is
every reason to believe that bankruptcy judges have always looked to the
incentives that might underlie various claimants' positions-even if they do
not memorialize that examination in their written opinions. Still, the lack of
an explicit use of such an approach outside of the settlement context requires
an explanation. As the following discussion suggests, one reason for the ab-
sence of such analysis may be found by examining the complex normative
commitments underlying Chapter 11.
In addition to the practical problems resulting from creditor indifference,
one of the primary difficulties in applying general principles of corporate gov-
ernance in the reorganization context is the lack of a clear consensus regard-
ing the goals of the bankruptcy process. For example, general governance
principles dictate that the views of shareholders regarding the viability of the
business enterprise be devalued in most cases. Shareholders of a hopelessly
insolvent enterprise put nothing at risk in the business decision to reorganize
rather than to liquidate. Since it is probably a safe empirical assumption that
most bankruptcies involve hopelessly insolvent enterprises, it is tempting to
go one step further and suggest that shareholders be completely disabled from
participating in the Chapter 11 case. It is possible that a blanket rule that
prohibited shareholders from participating in any Chapter 11 distribution
would eliminate the holdup power shareholders exercise in th6 case.71 While
such an approach might create difficulties in retaining the continued involve-
ment of shareholders who are critical to the viability of the business, it may
well be that the losses from reorganizations that fail for lack of continued
management involvement would be more than offset by the gains from im-
proved governance. 72
Commentators have advocated such proposals, but none have garnered
7'See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Preemptive Cram Down, 65 Am. BANK. L.J. 625,
633 (1991) (proposing a "preemptive cramdown" that would extinguish the claims of a class upon a show-
ing that claims of the senior classes clearly exceed the value of the debtor); Skeel, supra note 5, at 510-13
(suggesting that shareholders be disabled from holding elections during Chapter 11 and proposing a relaxed
"for cause" standard that would enable creditors to replace the board of directors in more cases).
7Various proposals for the repeal or radical reform of the process would create such a result. The
simplest such proposal, first suggested by Professor Baird, is the repeal of the reorganization provisions of
Chapter 11 and the use of Chapter 7 to conduct an auction for the business as a going concern. The
proceeds from the auction could then be distributed among the claimants in accordance with the absolute
priority rule. See Baird, supra note 41. The auction would end equity's participation in the case if the
proceeds were insufficient to satisfy all of the claims.
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widespread support. Perhaps one of the reasons for this lack of support is
suspicion regarding the claimed efficiency gains of such proposals. A more
fundamental reason is our national ambivalence regarding the purposes of
Chapter 11. As a general matter, we see Chapter 11 as a means of maximiz-
ing creditor recovery through the preservation of going concern value. At
the same time, Chapter 11 is hailed as a method of preserving jobs and com-
munities that are affected by financial failure."3 These goals are sometimes
complimentary; but, perhaps more often, they are directly conflicting.
When a company has real going concern value-that is when the value of
the company as an operating entity exceeds the liquidation value of the com-
pany-the goals of preserving jobs and communities and maximizing creditor
values are entirely consonant. To the extent that the reorganization process
keeps firms together that should be kept together everyone benefits.74
Where the asset values that might be achieved in an orderly liquidation ex-
ceed those of the firm as a going concern, however, the interests of the credi-
tors and those of the noncreditor stakeholders of the firm diverge.V" Of
course, if we could be certain regarding going concern value, or the lack
thereof, the conflict would present a straightforward policy question that
would be ripe for debate and resolution. But, in the real world of uncer-
tainty, the system does not explicitly resolve the conflict and ambivalence
reigns.
This ambivalence manifests itself in the reorganization governance struc-
ture. The continued participation of managers in the running of the corpora-
tion creates a bias in favor of reorganization.76 Shareholders and managers of
insolvent companies have every reason to desire an attempt at reorganization
regardless of the efficiency of such an attempt.77. The bias inures not only to
7 3The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code states, -he purpose of a business reorganization
case, unlike a liquidation case, is to restructure a business's finances so that it may continue to operate,
provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders." See HR.
REP. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179. A number of commentators
have stressed the importance of considering the effect of bankruptcy on constituencies other than the
investors. See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1341 (1987); Karen
Gross, The Need to Take Community Interests into Account in Bankruptcy: An Essay, 72 WAs5- U. L.Q.
1031 (1994); Donald R. Korobkin, Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy Law,
71 TEx. L. REv. 541, 545-547 (1993); Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of
Bankruptcy, 91 COLuM. L. REv. 717, 766-768 (1991); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policyina king in an
Imperfect World, 92 MicH. L. REv. 336, 352-360 (1993) [hereinafter Imperfect World]; Elizabeth Warren,
Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. Rev. 775, 785-789 (1987).
74Warren, Imperfect World, supra note 73, at 354-56.
7See Christopher W. Frost, Bankruptcy Redistributive Policies and the Limits of the Judicial Process,
74 N.C. L. Rev. 75, 94-99 (1995).
7 'See Christopher W. Frost, Asset Securitization and Corporate Risk Allocation, 72 Tui. L RLv. 101,
133-36 (1997).
77See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 5, at 685 CThe holders of underwater claims and interests
often have reason to oppose liquidation until the distributions to them under the reorganization plan have
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the benefit of the shareholders and managers, but also to the benefit of other
corporate stakeholders. Employees, suppliers and the surrounding commu-
nity benefit from the continued operation of the debtor78 as well as from the
possibility (albeit remote) of a turnaround in the business fortunes.79
While the Code does not explicitly take account of these stakeholder
interests, the structural bias in favor of reorganization may reflect a norma-
tive commitment that goes beyond that of efficiency. Recall that the stan-
dard for judging business decisions set out above is neutral regarding the
distributional effect of the decision.80 In that economic analysis, business de-
cisions are judged against a value maximizing standard. Distributional con-
cerns such as the effect of the decision on noncreditor stakeholders find no
place in such an inquiry.
Thus, the simple economic model of bankruptcy governance fails to cap-
ture what is really going on in bankruptcy cases. Rather than focusing solely
on value maximization, there is a complex array of considerations including,
perhaps first and foremost, a desire to maximize creditor recovery, but also
including a general sense that every corporate debtor deserves at least a
chance at reorganization-if not for the sake of the corporation itself, at least
for the sake of the corporation's dependents. Regardless of the desirability of
this policy,s1 the normative commitments underlying the approach seem to be
reflected in the Code and therefore have a real effect on the governance
structure.
This observation also provides an explanation for the use of residual claim
analysis in the litigation settlement cases82 and its absence in courts' analysis
of other types of issues. In the abstract, the question of whether to settle
litigation is no different from the decision to continue an attempt at reorgani-
zation, to invest in a new plant, or to make any other economic decision. A
decision to forego a settlement offer represents an investment of the settle-
ment proceeds in the litigation. A litigant seeking to maximize his or her
wealth will reject a settlement only if the present value of the expected re-
turns from the litigation exceed the present value of the settlement offer.
been fixed.). See also Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of
Directors' Duty to Creditors, 46 V.AsN. L. REv. 1485, 1496 (1993) (CShareholders [of an insolvent firm]
are highly motivated to overinvest in risky propositions and to underinvest in stable ones. Shareholders
also are likely to delay liquidation, even if this strategy causes further loss to the firm:).
7sSee What Constitutes Success in a Chapter 11? A Roundtable Discussion, 2 AM. BANUL INST. L.
REv. 229, 233-37 (1994).
7he company could strike oil. The point here is not that companies often strike oil during a reorgan-
ization, however. Instead, the point is that the possibility of some huge business success, however remote,
is of value to the stakeholders.
'See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
"1I have stated elsewhere that I find this more expansive view of the reorganization process flawed.
See Frost, supra note 75, at 112-38.
82See supra notes 47-60 and accompanying text.
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The settlement cases generally do not implicate any concerns about noninves-
tor stakeholders in the business, however. Thus, the residual claim approach
provides a way in which the court may analyze the settlement offer towards
the end of maximizing the value of the estate without concern over how the
decision might affect those interests.
In sum, the principal effect of the complex normative commitments under-
lying Chapter 11 is to make impossible the distillation of bankruptcy govern-
ance to a single principle. The competing concerns the bankruptcy process
addresses create conflicts that cannot be resolved by a simple rule of decision.
Instead, bankruptcy governance involves a flexible structure that includes the
allocation of responsibility for conflict resolution coupled with a respect for
local customs and judicial attitudes. The structure is adaptable-changing to
meet the facts of the situation at hand. It is also pragmatic-responding to
problems using the resources at hand.
III. THE PRAGMATISM OF BANKRUPTCY GOVERNANCE
Expanding the range of constituencies, the interests of whom the bank-
ruptcy system must consider, exacerbates the governance problems inherent
in Chapter 11. Reconsider the question of fiduciary duties. To the extent
that the Chapter 11 process is intended to benefit the shareholders of the
company as well as the creditors, one cannot take too literally the notion that
fiduciary duties should benefit creditors when the corporation is insolvent.
Shareholders are also worthy of managers' consideration. The need to serve
two masters with conflicting interests requires managers to strike some bal-
ance between the two.8 3 One commentator has suggested that the underly-
ing principle of bankruptcy governance is that the debtor in possession may,
and perhaps must,8 4 make an effort to reorganize the debtor (notwithstanding
the contrary desires of the creditors) unless that attempt appears to be hope-
83 While a conflict of obligation creates an uncomfortable legal environment that lacks
clarity, the officers, directors, and managers of the DIP owe obligations of care,
honesty, and reason to both the creditors of the bankrupt and its owners. The DIP
thus operates in an inherent conflict. The DIP's obligation is to resolve that con-
flict in a reasoned, balanced and honest manner.
Raymond T. Nimmer & Richard B. Feinberg, Chapter 11 Business Governance. Fiduciary Duties, Business
Judgment, Trustees and Exclusivity, 6 BANKL DEV. J. 1, 33 (1989). Professor Campbell points out that
outside the bankruptcy context managers often represent "multiple masters, including majority common
shareholders, minority common shareholders and preferred shareholders." See Campbell, supra note 12, at
593.
84 Congress intended to make it clear that, even if insolvency may render the share-
holders' continued economic interests in the corporation problematical, shareholders
nevertheless retain their ownership interest. Therefore, it would be anomalous to
interpret the Bankruptcy Code to mean that once a corporation is insolvent direc-
tors no longer owe any fiduciary duty to shareholders.
Miller, supra note 13, at 1494 n.119.
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less.8s While this principle appears to provide a standard against which man-
agerial actions might be judged, in practice the idea, standing alone, grants
managers broad discretion that is very difficult to limit.
8 6
As noted above,8 7 outside of bankruptcy, the fiduciary principle is but a
component of a broader governance structure that includes contract and mar-
ket elements. The special problems addressed by bankruptcy require that the
contract and market elements of the nonbankruptcy structure be curtailed.
In addition, the expansion of the scope of beneficiaries to whom managers
owe duties of care and loyalty further weakens the fiduciary principle as a
means of control over managerial misbehavior. Our normative commitments
preclude an approach to the supervision of management that focuses simply
on the interests and desires of the residual claimants to the assets. Add in a
dash of rational disinterest from a widely dispersed creditor body, and you
have a recipe for nearly unfettered discretion by possibly opportunistic
managers.
Of course, one must not forget that bankruptcy decisions take place in
the context of a judicial proceeding. Bankruptcy judges serve as the ultimate
defense against managerial self-aggrandizement. Most important decisions re-
quire judicial approval.88 Bankruptcy judges have the power to displace man-
agers through the appointment of a trustee.8 9 They can declare futile an
attempt to reorganize through their authority to convert or dismiss the
case.90 They can move cases along by shortening (or refusing to extend) the
exclusivity period.91 But, their ability to completely control the case is sub-
ject to an inherent limitation caused by the very source of their authority.
Bankruptcy judges are judges and thus are by nature limited to a judicial role.
They decide disputes that are brought before them. They can act only on the
information submitted to them. They are required to be above the fray, not
in the middle of it.
Notwithstanding this limitation, bankruptcy judges have devised ways in
which managerial discretion might be checked. Judges have taken a more
"Id. at 1496 C[I]t seems that when the financial condition of a corporation is hopelessly insolvent,
such that there is little or no chance that stockholders would have any equity interest in the corporation, a
debtor's directors no longer have any duty to pursue actions that may prejudice the debtor, its business,
and the interests of senior classes:').
ssThis problem has plagued advocates of corporate constituency statutes that enable managers to
consider the interests of nonsharcholder constituencies in responding to takeover attempts. See Campbell,
supra note 12, at 622 CConstituency statutes ... provide an obfuscation opportunity that facilitates
[managerial opportunism].").
s7See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
-5See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (1994) (requiring judicial approval of transactions outside of the ordinary
course of business).
8
91d. § 1104(a).
9Id. § 1112(b).
911d. § 1121(d).
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active role in case administration. They have made use of examiners and
mediators in an effort to resolve conflicts over plan development. Perhaps
more significantly-at least to debtors' counsel-courts have placed some of
the burden on the attorneys involved in the case to monitor the actions of
managers and to exercise some control over the reorganization process. The
following discussion addresses these methods and some of the problems that
they create.
A. CASE MANAGEMENT
Bankruptcy judges have shown a remarkable creativity in developing case
management techniques that preserve their role as impartial adjudicators
while insuring that Chapter 11 cases do not languish. These solutions range
from the systematic application of a 'fast track" procedural system for small
Chapter 11's to the ad hoc use of status conferences and scheduling orders
and sua spoonte hearings designed to move parties swiftly toward resolution of
the case.
In 1987, Bankruptcy Judge Small of the Eastern District of North Caro-
lina introduced a fast track procedure for small bankruptcy cases.92 The ap-
proach involves an accelerated schedule for the filing of the plan, and
conditional approval of the disclosure statement with the court approving
both the plan and the disclosure statement in one hearing.93 If the debtor
fails to comply with the deadlines, the Bankruptcy Administrator94 files a
motion requiring the debtor in possession to show cause why the case should
not be dismissed. Other judges have followed Judge Small's lead in institut-
ing fast track procedures.95
While the fast track system is widely touted as a method of reducing the
costs of Chapter 11, thus making reorganization available to small debtors,
the approach also has significant governance benefits. Managers recognizing
that a day of reckoning is close at hand will have less incentive to delay the
case in hopes of a turnaround in the debtor's business fortunes. The data
regarding fast track procedures certainly shows that the procedure moves
cases through Chapter 11 more quickly. A study of Chapter 11 cases before
and after Bankruptcy Judge Mund of the Central District of California insti-
tuted a fast track procedure show a substantial reduction in the median time
to confirmation (24.1 percent), conversion (44.1 percent), dismissal (53.5 per-
92See generally Hon. A. Thomas Small, Small Business Bankruptcy Cases, 1 Am. B~AiNo INsT. L. Rmv.
305 (1993) (discussing the fast track procedure).
93Id. at 309.
94The Bankruptcy Administrator is counterpart to the trustee in the judicial districts in Alabama and
North Carolina.
95See NBRC REPoRT, supra note 6, at 615 n.1569.
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cent), and in the total days in Chapter 11 (45.4 percent).96
We cannot always equate acceleration of the process with improved gov-
ernance, however. Managers still retain information and initiation advan-
tages that allow them to continue to exercise wide discretion. Nevertheless,
the fast track procedures do reduce the ability of managers to use delay to
perpetuate their employment and to extract concessions from creditors. The
stricter requirements of the fast track procedures provide creditors with
some assurance that there will be an outside limit to the delay they will
experience.
The 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code added provisions that
permit a business with debts under $2 million to elect fast track treatment.
97
These provisions limit the exclusivity period to 100 days and require that all
plans be filed within 160 days. An increase in the 100-day period requires
that the debtor show that the need for an increase is "caused by circum-
stances for which the debtor should not be held accountable."98 In addition
to the limitation on the exclusivity period, the small business amendments
allow the disclosure hearing to be combined with the confirmation hearing99
and grant the court discretion to dispense with the requirement that a credi-
tors committee be appointed. 100
As an approach to corporate governance, the 1994 statutory incorpora-
tion of the fast track approach leaves much to be desired, however. While
the small business definition captures a majority of Chapter 11 cases, 101 small
business treatment is only applicable to those debtors who elect such treat-
ment.'0 2 The procedures adopted by Judge Small and Judge Mund are not so
limited. Neither approach employs a dollar limitation. Instead, these judges
base their decision regarding fast track status on their own experience with
bankruptcy cases.'
0 3
9Hon. Samuel L. Bufford, Chapter 11 Case Management and Delay Reduction: An Empirical Study, 4
Am. BANK. INsr. L. REv. 85, 101 (1996).
97See 11 U.S.C. § 101(51C) (1994) (defining -small business" as having noncontingent unliquidated
debts of less than $2 million).
981d. § 1121(e)(3)(B).
-Id. § 1125(o.
"°'1d. § 1102(a)(3).
1° Statistics compiled by the NBRC indicate that seventy-two percent of all debtors fall within the $2
million debt limitation. NBRC REPoRT, supra note 6, at 630-31.
10 2See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(e). The only real incentives to elect such treatment are the streamlined
procedures for approval of the disclosure statement and the elimination of the mandatory creditors com-
mittee. These incentives are likely to be inadequate to ensure a widespread election of small business
treatment for two reasons. First, the combination of the disclosure statement and plan approval processes
may serve only to compress the time within which the debtor is expected to confirm a plan. Second,
statistics indicate that creditors' committees are rarely appointed in small bankruptcies without regard to
the mandatory language of 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a). See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
103Bufford, supra note 96, at 99; Small, supra note 92, at 307. Judge Small also seeks the recommenda-
tion of the Bankruptcy Administrator. Id.
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In addition to this structural approach to case management, the 1994
amendments explicitly grant bankruptcy judges the authority, on their own
motion or on motion of a party in interest, to hold a status conference and to
enter detailed scheduling orders.104 Bankruptcy Judge Fenning of the Central
District of California recently authored an article in which she noted:
Two kinds of chapter 11 cases come through the bankruptcy
judge's door: Debtors that may be able to confirm a plan, and
those that are hopeless. The two types call for different case
management approaches. The problem is telling them apart
at the beginning of the case. No simple litmus test is avail-
able, but most experienced bankruptcy judges find it rela-
tively easy to sort about 90 percent of all chapter 11 cases
into those two categories after just one or two hearings.1o05
Judge Fenning believes that early status conferences provide a method
through which she can identify "zombie cases" and terminate them quickly.'0 6
In a similar vein, Bankruptcy Judge Clark of the Western District of Texas
has written of the practice of judges in Texas who enter scheduling orders
that respond to motions for relief from the automatic stay in single asset real
estate cases.'07 These orders require the debtor to achieve confirmation of a
plan by a date certain or face foreclosure or case dismissal.' 08
One potential concern with this more active role for bankruptcy judges is
that it may conflict with their role as impartial adjudicators.ao9 The 1978
Code went to some lengths to remove bankruptcy judges from the day-to-day
administration of cases.1 0 Prior to the enactment of the Code, bankruptcy
judges took an active role in supervising and administering cases-a role that
Congress believed placed the judge in an "untenable position of conflict, and
seriously compromise[d] his impartiality as an arbiter of bankruptcy
10411 U.S.C. § 105(d). Many judges held conferences and entered such orders before the enactment of
the statutory authorization. Of course, one benefit of the explicit authority of the court to enter into
detailed scheduling orders is that it validates one of the key components of the fast track approach.
'°sHon. Lisa Hill Fenning, Judicial Case Management Is No Hostile Takeover, 15-SEP AM. BANM.
INST. J. 35 (1996).
"°Judge Fenning also suggests that bankruptcy judges should use their authority to mediate funda-
mental disputes in an effort to arrive at a consensual plan. Id. at 36-37.
1°7Hon. Leif M. Clark, Chapter 11 -Does One Size Fit All?, 4 Am BA I-.s. INST. L. REv. 167, 191
(1996).
10Sld. at 191-92.
'09See John D. Ayer, How to Think About Bankruptcy Ethics, 60 AM. B.Nx L.J. 355, 397 (1986)
CThe extent to which a judge may, in fact, act sua sponte is a measure of how much he is a participant, and
how much a mere decider, of issues.").
"0°ee id. ("It seems clear that a dominant purpose of the 1978 Code was to reduce the judges sua
sponte role.:). See also Harvey R. Miller, The Changing Face of Chapter 11: A Reemergence of the Bank-
ruptcy Judge as Producer, Director, and Sometimes Star of the Reorganization Passion Play, 69 AM. BAmcEL
Q 431, 433-34 (1996).
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disputes.""'
Active case management is a far cry from the administrative duties for-
merly placed on bankruptcy judges, however. 1 2  Federal and state judges
have increasingly taken an active role in managing cases to assure that they
move toward completion." 3  Also, as one commentator has pointed out,114
Congress evidenced an intent to provide judges more latitude in controlling
cases when it added language to § 105 in 1986 making explicit the authority
of bankruptcy judges to issue sua sponte orders~1s This change has increased
substantially the ability of bankruptcy judges to actively manage cases.
Prior to the 1986 amendments, § 1112(b) allowed only a "party in inter-
est" to move for a conversion or dismissal of a Chapter 11 case. The legisla-
tive history surrounding the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code shows that
the restriction of § 1112(b) to parties in interest was a conscious choice on
the part of the Code's drafters that evidenced their concern with "excessive
judicial entanglement in administrative matters." 16  This history, coupled
with the plain meaning of § 1112(b), led most courts considering the question
to conclude that they were without the power to dismiss or convert cases
sua sponte" 7 unless there was a showing that the case was filed with an
"intent to abuse the judicial process in the hope of delaying creditors.""
1"'HK. REP. No. 95-595, at 89 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. 5963, 6050.
112Of particular concern was the bankruptcy judges involvement in the appointment and supervision
of trustees who were involved as litigants in the cases. See Miller, supra note 110, at 434.
1 3See, e.g., MANuAL FOR Co~ni=x LmiTGATION TimD 14-15 (1995) (characterizing effective judicial
management as active, substantive, timely, continuing, firm but fair, and carefully prepared). The Fifth
Circuit has drawn a similar analogy:
We do not believe, however, that Congress thereby intended to relieve the bank-
ruptcy judge of the responsibility of managing the cases before him in such a way as
to promote the objective and goals of the Bankruptcy Code. Our conclusion in this
respect is strengthened by the fact that the bankruptcy court is an adjunct of the
district court. District court judges function under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 with full
power and responsibility to manage their cases and with the directive to move their
cases in such a way as to promote fairness to the parties and judicial economy.
United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs, Ltd. (In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs,
Ltd.), 808 F.2d 363, 373-74 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (footnote omitted), affd, 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
114 Miller, supra note 110, at 435-36.
115See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994) Q"No provision of this title providing for the raising of an issue by a
party in interest shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any
determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an
abuse of process."). This language was added by the Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and
Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 203, 100 Stat. 3088, 3097.
'1 6Gusam Restaurant Corp. v. Speciner (In re Gusam Restaurant Corp.), 737 F.2d. 274, 277 (2d Cir.
1984). The Gusam opinion collects the legislative history underlying § 1112(b) as originally enacted. Id.
at 276-77. See also In re Moog, 774 F.2d. 1073, 1076 (11th Cir. 1985).
al 7See Gusam, 737 F.2d at 277. See also Warner v. Universal Guardian Corp. (In re Warner), 30 B.L
528 (BA.P. 9th Cir. 1983).
"'See Moog, 774 F.2d at 1076-77 (collecting cases).
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The 1986 amendment to § 105(a) frees bankruptcy courts from the con-
straints imposed by § 1112.119 The legislative history is sparse, however;
Senator Hatch's statement in support of the amendment indicates that the
change was intended to allow bankruptcy judges more latitude in managing
their cases. 120 As further support for a more active bankruptcy judiciary,
several cases have cited the admonition of the Fifth Circuit in United Savings
Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd. (In re Timbers of Inwood
Forest Associates, Ltd.):
Early and ongoing judicial management of Chapter 11 cases
is essential if the Chapter 11 process is to survive and if the
goals of reorganizability on the one hand, and creditor pro-
tection, on the other, are to be achieved. In almost all cases
the key to avoiding excessive administrative costs, which are
borne by the unsecured creditors, as well as excessive inter-
est expense, which is borne by all creditors, is early and
stringent judicial management of the case.' 21
The court's opinion in In re Tax Shop, Inc.'22 provides an example of
such judicial management in the context of a fast track case. In Tax Shop,
the court refused to reinstate a case that had been dismissed for the debtor's
failure to comply with the court's fast track scheduling order. As in many
small cases, the creditors showed no interest in the case.' 23 Tax Shop illus-
trates the efficacy of the sua sponte motion for dismissal for these small cases.
In re Great American Pyramid Joint Venture,124 provides an example of
the use of a sua sponte order in a more complex case. Great American Pyra-
mid involved the Chapter 11 cases of six entities that were involved in the
development of an entertainment and sports arena (in the shape of a pyramid)
in Memphis. Despite the involvement of creditors and other parties in inter-
119See, e.g., Finney v. Smith (In re Finney), 992 F.2d 43, 44 (4th Cir. 1993); In re Argus Group 1700,
Inc., 206 B.R. 757 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Pleasant Pointe Apartments, Ltd. v. Kentucky Hous. Corp, 139 B.L
828 (W.D. Ky. 1992); In re Petit, 189 B.L 227 (Bankr. D. Me. 1995); In re Tax Shop, Inc, 173 B.R. 605
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1994); In re B & B West 164th Street Corp, 147 B.R. 832 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992); In
re Great Am. Pyramid Joint Venture, 144 B.R. 780 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1992); In re Daily Corp, 72 B.R.
489 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
"2°1This bill also allows a bankruptcy court to take any action on its own, or to make any necessary
determination to prevent an abuse of process and to help expedite a case in a proper and justified manner."
132 CONG. Rac. 815,096 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Senator Hatch) (emphasis added).
121808 F.2d 363, 373 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc), affd, 484 U.S. 365 (1988). See Tax Shop, 173 B.R. at
608 (quoting Timbers); In re Public Serv. Co., 84 B.R. 1, 2 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988) (same); In re Bayou Self,
Inc., 73 B.R. 682, 684 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1987) (same); Daily Corp., 72 B.R. at 494 (same). See also Miller,
supra note 110, at 435.
122173 B.R. at 605.
.23The court held a status conference at which no creditors appeared, id. at 606, and held a show cause
hearing that no one attended. Id. at 607.
124144 B.R. at 780.
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est, the court issued a sua sponte order to show cause why the cases should
not be converted or dismissed.' 25 Before the hearing was held on the court's
order, the City and County filed their own § 1112(b) motions.126 While it is
difficult to determine what would have happened absent the court's order, it
is likely that the order had the effect of spurring the creditors to action.' 27
This case illustrates one of the benefits of a sua sponte order. Motions to
dismiss or convert require the debtor to provide some evidence of the likeli-
hood of a reorganization. They provide a means through which the reality of
the debtors efforts to reorganize may be examined. Making such a determina-
tion can be a complex undertaking, however, and creditors may be reluctant
to bring a § 1112(b) motion prematurely. Sua sponte orders might act as a
form of judicial signal to the parties in interest that the judge would be recep-
tive to a § 1112 motion, which signal might in turn overcome creditors' re-
luctance to place the issue squarely before the judge.
Short of outright dismissal, several bankruptcy courts have used their au-
thority under § 105(a) to order the appointment of a bankruptcy trustee. In
Fukutomi v. U.S. Trustee (In re Bibo, Inc.),' 28 the Ninth Circuit approved the
bankruptcy court's use of its sua sponte authority to appoint a trustee when,
on a motion to approve management fees, the court found documentation
that established a kickback scheme involving a principal of the debtor.129
The Ninth Circuit held that "[t]he statute plainly gives the bankruptcy
judge authority to appoint a trustee sua sponte,"130 and further held that the
evidence established cause to appoint a trustee.13  Finally, the Ninth Circuit
rejected the principal's claim that the bankruptcy court denied him due pro-
cess by denying him a continuance prior to the hearing on the court's mo-
tion.132 The Ninth Circuit held that the notice and hearing the principal
received were "appropriate in the circumstances" given the clear evidence of
525Id. at 782.
126Id. at 782 n.2.
127The court converted five of the six cases under consideration and placed the remaining case on a
"fast track." Id. at 792.
12876 F.3d 256 (9th Cir. 1996).
1
29
Id. at 257.
1301d. at 258.
1311d.
112Upon the bankruptcy court's discovery of the documentation and examination of one witness, the
court granted a short recess so that the principal could consult with counsel for the debtor. Id. at 257.
After consulting with counsel, the debtor requested a continuance. The court denied the request, stating:
I want someone to take over all the assets of the debtor today. I do not want Mr.
Fukutomi or Ms. Fukutomi to have access to any of the assets of this estate herein'
after from the moment they walk out the door until all this case is resolved one way
or another.
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fraud and the consequent threat to the estate. 133
Of course, such judicial management techniques only have the effect of
enabling the judge to consider the substantive issues involved in the case.
They provide no indication of how to resolve those questions. In Great
American Pyramid, the court recognized the difficult substantive problems
involved in the case as it framed the issue:
Query, what is a reasonable breathing spell and fair opportu-
nity for a chapter 11 debtor to seek to rehabilitate before
pulling the reorganization plug? The ultimate questions for
judicial determination here, considering the realities of these
case administrations at this time, is whether reorganization is
now visionary only or hopeless and whether liquidation or
dismissal is the only appropriate solution under the existing
circumstances? 134
Case administration provides no answer to this dilemma and our ambivalence
over the purposes of Chapter 11 precludes an easy answer.
This observation points to one of the principal dangers of active judicial
case management. While status conferences, fast track procedures and sua
sponte orders may be efficacious means of framing issues and assuring that
management is not using the protection of Chapter 11 merely to perpetuate
itself in office, quick resolution of bankruptcy cases should not be an end in
and of itself. Take for example the decision in In re Petit.135 Petit involved
an individual Chapter 11 debtor whose principal asset was a cause of action
against Key Bank. All of the counts in the complaint had been dismissed or
disposed of through summary judgment against the debtor. One count re-
mained on appeal, however, and at least one expert testified that the debtors
damages were in excess of $30 million.' 36 Despite the fact that the debtor,
the creditors, the trustee, and the United States Trustee believed that the
issue on appeal should keep the reorganization alive,' 37 the court sua sponte
converted the case to a Chapter 7.138 It is difficult to tell from the opinion
precisely why the Petit court was determined to convert the case in the face
of opposition from every constituency. The court indicates its belief that the
debtor may have duped the creditors by holding out the possibility of such a
large return.139 This reading of the case is cause for concern. To the extent
1331d. at 259. See also In re Embrace Systems Corp., 178 B.R 112 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1995) (lack of
disinterestedness of sole employee of debtor in possession is basis for sua sponte appointment of a trustee).
3 4In re Great Am. Pyramid Joint Venture, 144 B.R. 780, 789 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1992).
'"5189 B.R. 227 (Bankr. D. Me. 1995).
136Id. at 228.
137Id.
13S1d. at 229.
'"39Id. at 228 (It is a fact of life, however, that while there is no statutory requirement that creditors
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bankruptcy courts use judicial case management to substitute their judgment
for that of the interested parties, they may step beyond the bounds of impar-
tial decisionmaker and into the role of active participant in the case. 140
The court's opinion in In re Mother Hubbard, Inc.141 is an example of the
sensitivity required when a bankruptcy court is exercising its authority to act
sua sponte. In Mother Hubbard, the president and sole shareholder of the
debtor proposed a plan that sought to contribute a late filed unsecured claim
as new value.142 After denying the president's motion to* deem the claim
timely filed and after permitting an unsecured creditor to file a competing
plan, the court considered sua sponte whether to hold a hearing to consider
the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee.' 43 In its discussion of the issue, the
court noted the danger of involvement with administrative matters and
stated its belief that the impetus for such a motion must come from the rec-
ord.x44 While the court expressed its concern regarding the goals and mo-
tives of the debtor's president and sole shareholder, it noted that both the
unsecured creditor, who was also the proponent of a competing plan, and the
creditor's committee had "sufficient incentive to monitor the Debtor's busi-
ness activities (and [the president's] business judgments)."145 Accordingly,
the court declined to order a hearing but admonished the president regarding
the conduct of the business during the confirmation process' 46 and invited
parties in interest with knowledge of facts constituting cause to file a
motion.' 47
In sum, while case management alone cannot provide substantive solu-
tions to the complex questions presented in a Chapter 11 case, it can assure
the parties that the court will address the question in a timely manner. A
necessary prerequisite to improved governance in Chapter 11 is a system that
periodically frames the issues for the ultimate decisionmaker. As studies of
be realistic or reasonable in their expectations of success, the Court does not enjoy such latitude and
neither may we permit the Debtor to fantasize indefinitely.").
1
It is possible that the court's decision might be justified on the grounds that the Chapter 11 process
could achieve nothing that could not be achieved more expeditiously in a Chapter 7. If this were the case,
considerations of judicial economy coupled with a lack of benefit from judicial efforts might warrant con-
version. The opinion is devoid of such analysis, however.
141152 B.R. 189 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1993).
142Id. at 191.
143Jd. at 196-97.
144Id. at 197 (-This judge also strongly believes it is improper to sua sponte raise such an issue unless
persuasive evidence comes to the court's attention on the record which may lead to a conclusion that cause
exists or an abuse of process is occurring:").
1451d.
146
Id. CVan Zoeren shall act in accordance with his fiduciary obligations, as contrasted to his personal
desires, to assure a 'level playing field' is maintained until the conclusion of the confirmation hearings on
the competing plans.-").
147Id. at 198.
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small business reorganizations have found, small business bankruptcy cases
often leave managers in full control of the process because creditors have
little incentive to become actively involved in the cases. 148 Active case man-
agement can provide a counterbalance to the control managers assert over
these cases.
B. FLEXIBLE USE OF EXAMINERS
Even with active case management, bankruptcy judges suffer an informa-
tional disadvantage vis-a-vis managers which impairs the ability of the bank-
ruptcy governance structure to provide adequate checks on managers. The
caseload of bankruptcy judges is ever increasing as new bankruptcy filings
reach record heights.149 The resulting time limitations, coupled with the lim-
its of the adjudicative role, allow managers to restrict the information avail-
able to the parties and to the judge.
Of course, the Code requires that managers provide some information to
the other participants in the case. The Code requires the debtor in posses-
sion to file periodic reports and summaries of operation of the business with
the court, the United States Trustee, and the taxing entities, and to respond
to requests for information by parties in interest. 5 0 In addition, creditors'
committees, in those cases in which they are appointed, are charged with
consulting with the debtor in possession concerning the administration of the
case and investigating the debtor and its management.' 5 '
While these provisions assure that the debtor's managers are subject to
broad oversight, they may be inadequate to highlight more subtle information
that managers hold about the prospects for reorganization. Only involvement
in the day-to-day operations of the debtor will provide the detail required to
make an accurate assessment of those prospects. In addition, the acquisition
of knowledge about alternatives to reorganization requires that one take the
initiative to explore those alternatives. While an active creditors' committee
in a large case may take that initiative,' 52 in smaller cases there may be no-
14See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
'49Total bankruptcy filings reached a record high of 1,178,555 in 1996. NEw GENERATION RE-
sEARcH, 1997 BANKRUPTCY YEARBOOK AND ALMANAC 32 (1997). Thus, even though the Chapter 11
caseload is about half of what it was during the peak years 1985-86 and 1990-93, see id., the bankruptcy
system is strained.
15011 U.S.C. §§ 704(8), 1106(a)(1) (1994).
1511d. § 1103(c).
"'52 Even in large cases, the creditors' committee may be at a severe disadvantage. Professor Zaretsky
questioned the ability of creditors' committees to control the management of the debtor"
[A] committee is not involved in the day-to-day operations of the debtor and is
often in the position of responding to initiatives generated by the debtor. Its infor-
mation comes primarily from the debtor and may reflect the debtor's sometimes
unduly optimistic assessments. Accordingly, a committee usually cannot set the
direction of the business or the tone of the operations.
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one to do so but the judge who, of course, must look to managers for
suggestions.
Commentators have suggested that courts make flexible use of the provi-
sions of Chapter 11 allowing the court to appoint an examiner to counteract
this difficulty.153 Traditionally, examiners have been appointed in cases in
which there has been some need to investigate the prebankruptcy conduct of
the firm's managers or shareholders. But, in several large cases, courts have
charged examiners with mediating disputes, bringing suits, and operating the
debtor's business.' 54 Courts could use examiners to provide the court with
an unbiased review of specific decisions, thus alleviating somewhat the infor-
mation monopoly held by the managers.' 55
Section 1104 provides the necessary authority for such a flexible use of
examiners. The statute authorizes the court to appoint an examiner to "con-
duct such an investigation of the debtor as is appropriate" if the appointment
is in the best interests of the creditors, equity holders and other interests in
the estate.'5 6 Section 1104(c) provides a list of the subjects of such an inves-
tigation that seems to require that there be some allegation of fraud, dishon-
esty, or incompetence, but the provision makes clear that the list is
illustrative only.
157
A few courts have made use of this flexible authority, typically coupling
specific informational charges with a general charge to mediate the case. For
example, the court's charge to the examiner in the Apex Oil Company Chap-
ter 11 case included taking "any necessary and appropriate actions in further-
ance of assisting the Court and parties in bringing these proceedings to a just,
prompt and economic disposition."158 This broad charge required the exam-
iner to undertake, for example, extensive monitoring of the debtor's efforts to
stabilize its business postpetition; 5 9 mediation of a number of disputes;
60
Zaretsky, supra note 43, at 915.
1531d. at 940-61; Frost, supra note 5, at 132. Professor Adams has proposed the more radical solution
under which an appointed trustee would share decisionmaking authority with prepetition managers. See
Adams, supra note 5, at 620-23.
154
Se Zaretsky, supra note 43, at 940-61 (discussing the various uses to which courts have put
examiners).
1--'d. at 955 C[S]ome bankruptcy courts have employed examiners as the 'eyes and ears' of the court
15611 U.S.C. § 1104(c) appears to require the court to appoint an examiner when the debtor's debts
exceed $5 million. Several courts have denied appointment of examiners in such cases, however. See
Zaretsky, supra note 43, at 938-39. The National Bankruptcy Review Commission has recommended that
the mandatory language in § 1104(c) be deleted. NBRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 23.
15711 U.S.C. § 102(3) (1994) (stating tht the terms "includes" and "including" are not limiting). In re
Public Serv. Co., 99 B.R. 177, 182 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1989) (The Debtor's strict interpretation of examiner
as merely an investigator of fraud and other irregularities is unwarranted.").
15 n reApex Oil Co, 111 B.R. 235,237 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990), rev'd, 132 B.R. 613 (E.D. Mo. 1991),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 960 F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1992).
M1Id. at 238.
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and an investigation into the good faith of asset purchasers for purposes of
§ 363(m). 161
The court in In re Public Service Co.162 appointed an examiner to resolve
a somewhat more specific problem. The parties in Public Service had reached
a difficult point in negotiations that revolved around the arcana of utility
rate-making. In addition to the desirability of a third-party mediator, the
court noted that it needed assistance "in understanding some of the rather
arcane concepts employed in the utility rate-setting regulatory world in order
to properly perform its duties."163
Finally, in In re Big Rivers Electric Corp.,164 the court appointed an exam-
iner specifically to address allegations that management was violating its fidu-
ciary duty to maximize the value of the estate regarding a long-term lease of
substantially all of its income-generating assets.' 65 The examiner's investiga-
tion revealed the existence of a "No Shopping" clause in the lease and con-
cluded that the debtor had "failed to develop bids submitted by parties other
than [the proposed lessee]. " 166 The court, noting its duty to maximize the
value of the estate 67 as well as the duty of the debtor to do the same, 168
subsequently ordered an auction of the assets resulting in a binding commit-
ment for $50 million more than was offered by the original proposed lessee.169
Thus, through the use of an examiner, the court was able to penetrate the
informational monopoly held by management.
The combination of the investigative functions of the examiner with a
mediation function provides governance benefits in addition to the expected
economies associated with alternative dispute resolution.'7 The require-
ment that the examiner/mediator file a report with the court may deter man-
agers or shareholders from taking strategic positions in the negotiations
simply to delay the ultimate resolution of the case.' 7 ' In addition, involve-
16°Id. at 241.
16299 B.R. 177 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1989).
1631d. at 182.
164213 B.R. 962 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1997).
1651d. at 965-67.
6'Id. at 968.
:671d. at 970.
16 id. at 971.
1
6 9
1d.
'70The requirement that the examiner file a report may, however, impair the ability to reach a settle-
ment because the parties cannot be assured that their communications with the examiner will remain
confidential. Mabey, Tabb, and Dizengoff note that, -an examiner as mediator is not classic mediation.
Rather, the examiner is clothed with judicial authority ... .7 Ralph R. Mabey et al., Expanding the Reach
of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Bankruptcy: The Legal and Practical Bases for the Use of Mediation
and the Other Forms of ADR, 46 S.C. L. REv. 1259 (1995). Thus, the use of an examiner as an "investiga-
tive mediator" may involve a tradeoff between governance and alternative dispute resolution benefits.
17111 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(4) (1994).
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ment in the negotiations may provide the examiner with an opportunity to
obtain information about the prospects of the business and the managers'
operation of the business that would not otherwise come to light.
Of course, examiners are not without costs and the economics of many
small cases will not support the luxury of third-party involvement. Thus, it
is not surprising that most of the reported cases in which courts have used
examiners, as described here, have involved large debtors with active credi-
tors committees and complex issues. But, if the task of the examiner is nar-
rowly defined to the investigation of the viability of the enterprise or the
desirability of a particular course of action, the court may keep the costs in
check. In addition, examiners need not be bankruptcy attorneys. 172 If the
examiner's task is to evaluate a business decision, the analysis might be most
appropriately accomplished by someone knowledgeable in the field.
In addition to cost, the flexible use of examiners may give rise to concerns
regarding the adjudicative function of the bankruptcy judge. To the extent
bankruptcy judges use examiners as a surrogate judge with the ability to
achieve results that they themselves might be prohibited from accomplishing,
their role as impartial adjudicators of disputes might be called into question.
As noted above,173 the Bankruptcy Code was intended to relieve bankruptcy
judges from the duty of administering cases in an effort to assure that the
judges could exercise their adjudicative powers free from any appearance of
partiality. To this end, Bankruptcy Rule 9003 prohibits ex parte communica-
tion by an examiner unless otherwise authorized by applicable law.174 This
prohibition assures that the judge remains above the fray as an adjudicator of
facts developed through the normal operation of the adversary system.
C. ATTORNEY COMPENSATION
One way that bankruptcy judges have found to improve governance is to
look to the professionals already involved in the case for assistance in policing
managers. In large reorganizations, this burden is shared by the wide range of
professionals employed by the debtor in possession, the committees, and
other significant creditors.175 In smaller cases, which are marked by the ab-
sence of committee and large creditor involvement, a large share of the gov-
ernance burden often rests with the attorney for the debtor in possession. In
what is doubtless an alarming trend for bankruptcy debtor's counsel, bank-
172 NBRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 658 (discussing the Licensed Insolvency Officer concept used
in the United Kingdom in which accountants are used to administer insolvency cases).
"7See supra notes 109-111 and accompanying text.
174FED. R. Bnia. P. 9003(a). In Big Rivers, the court held that its earlier uncontested final order
authorizing ex parte communications by the examiner constituted "applicable law" for purposes of Rule
9003(a). 213 B.R. at 975-76. In addition, the court held that the failure to object to the order rendered
subsequent motions to disqualify the judge and to remove the examiner untimely. Id at 972-73.
",Sec supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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ruptcy courts have increasingly used their authority over fee applications as
a method of policing managerial and shareholder behavior in Chapter 11
cases.
Outside of bankruptcy, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct enjoin
attorneys retained by "organizations" (including corporations) to remember
that they represent "the organization acting as through its duly authorized
constituents" 176 and require that conflicts between their client and the indi-
viduals running the client (including the person who signs the attorney's
check) are to be resolved in favor of the client.177 The Model Rules provide
some guidance to attorneys regarding the appropriate response to actions by
corporate officers and employees that the lawyer believes are not in the best
interest of the corporation-including, as a last resort, resignation from the
relationship.178
While corporate representation sometimes results in some discomfort for
attorneys, the ethical obligations of an attorney representing the debtor in
possession' 79 present difficulties that go well beyond those facing corporate
lawyers outside of the bankruptcy or insolvency context. The attorney's ob-
ligation to the "estate7 requires more vigilance than is required of corporate
attorneys outside of bankruptcy. 80 In bankruptcy, as one court put it, "the
duty to advise the client [the DIP] goes beyond responding to the client's
request for advice. It requires an active concern for the interests of the es-
tate, and its beneficiaries."' 8 ' This enhanced obligation, coupled with the
role of counsel for the debtor in possession as an officer of the court, ensures
that the attorney is at the center of Chapter 11 governance controversies.
Not only do an attorney's fiduciary obligations extend to all who are inter-
ested in the estate, the attorney has a duty to preserve the integrity of the
17 6
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(a) (1983).
177 If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person
associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act
in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to
the organization, or a violation of law which reasonably might be imputed to the
organization, and is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, the
lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the
organization....
Id., Rule 1.13(b).
i7Sd., Rule 1.13(c).
i79Counsel for the debtor in possession is herein referred to as 'counsel for the debtor in possession,"
rather than "counsel for the debtor." This reference is used to draw attention to the fact that the attorney
technically represents an entity that has duties to the estate. Neither the Code nor courts are scrupulous
about the distinction between the debtor and the debtor in possession because, when a Chapter 11 trustee
has not been appointed, there is no distinction. 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (1994).
'8sSee Ayer, supra note 109, at 387-90.
'S In re Wilde Horse Enters., Inc., 136 B.R 830, 840 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991).
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bankruptcy process. 182 The obligations of counsel for the debtor in posses-
sion include a duty to "carefully monitor each case and encourage conversion
or dismissal without delay when it becomes apparent that reorganization is
no longer feasible or that wrongdoing is taking place." 18 3 Not only must
counsel be vigilant in advising the debtor in possession's managers regarding
their fiduciary obligations, counsel has an affirmative duty to inform the court
of the managers' lapses.'
84
Of course these enhanced duties create what Professor Westbrook has
referred to as "unavoidable conflicts inherent in the representation of
DIPs."185 The essence of this conflict lies in the divergence of incentives held
by the various participants in the case. Because the shareholders and manag-
ers are likely to have interests that differ radically from those of the creditors,
a conflict is unavoidable. The attorney for the debtor in possession is there-
fore thrust into the eye of the storm and must avoid the urge to view the
shareholders and managers as her principal constituency.'8 6
By far the most notorious case addressing these inherent conflicts is In re
Kendavis Industries International, Inc.'87 Kendavis involved a large reorgani-
zation in which the creditors' committee and certain individual creditors
moved for disgorgement of fees paid to counsel for the debtor in possession
(Locke, Purnell, Boren, Laney and Healey). 88 The gravamen of the movants'
allegations was that Locke Purnell had represented both the debtor in posses-
sion and its controlling shareholders (the Davis family) and had taken actions
designed to benefit only the Davis family.' 89 The court noted that correspon-
18 2Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America (In reJLM, Inc.), 210 B.R. 19,26 (BA.P.
2d Cir. 1997).183In re Pacific Forest Indus, Inc, 95 B.R. 740, 744 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989).
1"JLM, 210 B.R. at 26 (collecting cases).
18SJay Lawrence Westbrook, Fees and Inherent Conflicts of Interest, 1 Am. BAKP.. INST. L. REv. 287
(1993). See also Ayer, supra note 109, at 387-95 (discussing the overlapping roles of all of the attorneys in
the case); C. R. Bowles, Jr. & Nancy B. Rapoport, Has the DIP's Attorney Become the Ultimate Creditors'
Lawyer in Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases?, 5 Am. B~AsN.._ INsT. L. REv. 47 (1997) (discussing the
inherent conflicts involved in representing a debtor in possession). Cf Bruce A. Markell, The Folly of
Representing Insolvent Corporations: Examining Lawyer Liability and Ethical Issues Involved in Extending
Fiducia7y Duties to Creditors, 6 J. BANcLR L. & P.AC. 403 (1997) (discussing the conflicts involved in
representing insolvent corporations outside of bankruptcy and concluding that "no ethical or rational law-
yer should ever willingly represent an insolvent corporation outside bankruptcy").186.It is to ensure [the] integrity of the bankruptcy process where, by definition, a debtor in posses-
sion is not disinterested, that counsel for the debtor in possession must be disinterested, free of any adverse
entanglements which could cloud its judgment respecting what is best for the estate." JLM, 210 B.R. at
26.
18791 B.R. 742 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988). See also Diamond Lumber, Inc. v. Unsecured Creditors'
Comm. of Diamond Lumber, Inc., 88 BR. 773 (N.D. Tex. 1988); In re Chapel Gate Apts. Ltd, 64 B.R. 569
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986). Professor Westbrook refers to all of these cases as the Kendavis trio of cases.
Westbrook, supra note 185, at 290.
'8s91 B.R. at 744.
1S19 d. at 745-46.
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dence among Locke Purnell, the Davis family, and other professionals in-
volved in the case indicated that the Davis family believed that Locke Purnell
represented them.19° In addition, the court looked to the actions of Locke
Purnell during the proceeding. 191 The court stated that the activities of
Locke Purnell "were designed to further the interests of the Davis family"
192
and concluded that the totality of the evidence could lead only to the conclu-
sion that Locke Purnell represented the interests of the Davis family. 19 3 The
court awarded Locke Purnell only $2,000,000 of the $4,000,000 in fees previ-
ously awarded-requiring disgorgement of the balance.
194
In the course of the Kendavis decision, the court engaged in a detailed
analysis of conflicts of interest in the bankruptcy process. The court set the
stage for this broader inquiry by stating that the case 'demonstrates the
problems inherent in a popular theory regarding representation of Debtors in
bankruptcy, the concept of the 'potential' conflict of interest . .. 7195 In its
discussion, the court noted that the history and statutory language of the
disinterestedness requirement of § 327196 creates no room for allowing repre-
sentation of multiple entities in one or a series of related cases on the basis
that the conflicts created are only "potential."197 The court's broad holding is
that "whenever counsel for a debtor corporation has any agreement, express
or implied, with management or a director of the debtor, or with a share-
holder, or with any control party, to protect the interest of that party, coun-
sel holds a conflict." 198
19Id. at 750-51. One of these items clearly demonstrates the nature of the conflict. One of the family
members wrote 'As Barb [apparently a member of Locke Purnell] continues to repeat and everyone agrees
there is no shareholder equity-so we've got nothing to loose [sic] -The banks have it all on the line
now-not us. Id. at 765.
'9 1Id. at 749-751. Specifically, the court examined the debtors new value plan finding that it was
unconfirmable because it did not propose a substantial contribution, see id. at 749, and Locke Purnelrs
vigorous opposition to the committees plan which called for 100 percent payment to all nonbank and
noninsider creditors. Id. at 750.
19 2Id. at 752.
19 31d. at 751.
1
9 4
1d. at 762-3. See 11 U.S.C. § 328(c) (1994) (allowing the court to deny allowance of compensation
if "at any time during such professional person's employment.... such professional person is not a disinter-
ested person, or represents or holds an interest adverse to the interest of the estate ... " In addition, the
court ordered disgorgement of a $500,000 retainer that had been paid to Locke Purnell by a related
Debtor but that had not been disclosed to the court. 91 B.R at 762. See 11 U.S.C. § 329(a) (requiring
attorneys to file a statement of compensation paid or agreed to be paid).
'9591 B.R. at 744.
196Section 327(a) of the Code requires that professionals employed by the trustee not "hold or repre-
sent an interest adverse to the estate" and that such persons be "disinterested." 11 U.S.C. § 327(a).
Section § 101(14)(E) further defines disinterested person as a person who, "does not have an interest
materially adverse to the interest of the estate or of any class of creditors or equity security holders...
Id. § 101(14)(E).
19791 B.R at 752-57.
19'Id. at 754.
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Courts considering similar situations often note the difficulties that a
rigid interpretation of the disinterestedness requirement would create, usu-
ally concluding that the Kendavis result should be limited to egregious con-
flicts such as those considered in that case. 199 For example, the court in In re
Howell200 approved counsel for the debtor's application for compensation
even though the attorney represented the bankruptcy estates of both a
closely held corporation (a beauty school) and its individual shareholders.
The court distinguished Kendavis on its facts citing the egregious nature of
the Kendavis attorney's behavior.201 The court also rejected the reasoning of
the Kendavis court, applying instead a potential conflicts analysis.
20 2 Ulti-
mately, the court in Howell concluded that "The unity of interest and inter-
dependence that exists between the debtors and the school exemplify the
4mom & pop' nature of the present situation so that Archer's dual representa-
tion was both economically reasonable and legally appropriate."20 3 Thus, the
cost of separate counsel may be one factor that limits strict adherence to the
disinterestedness analysis.
The court in In re Office Products of America, Inc.204 provided another
rationale for limiting the holding of Kendavis to its facts. In OPA, the
trustee, joined by creditors and an unofficial creditors' committee, objected to
the fee application of counsel for the debtor in possession (Gresham Davis).
Among their arguments was that Gresham Davis represented the interests of
OPA's management in fighting a conversion of the case to Chapter 7.205
Upon a review of the detail of the fee application, the court agreed that "at
some point in the representation, the interests of the officers and directors of
OPA may have become elevated above those of the estate."20 6 In particular,
the court focused on the fact that management's proposed plan of reorganiza-
tion "could redound only to the benefit of the owners of the enterprise and
not to its creditors .... "207 The court refused, however, to find a conflict
based solely on the fact that management had proposed a cramdown plan
benefitting only the shareholders:
'99See, e.g., In re Spanjer Bros, Inc, 191 B.R. 738, 754 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (noting lack of evidence
that the attorney for the debtor in possession represented management, directors, or shareholders); In re
Howell, 148 B.R. 269,271 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1992) (limiting the Kendavis result to egregious behavior); In
re Office Prods. of America, Inc, 136 B.R. 983, 988 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992) (limiting application of
Kendavis to cases with "compelling facts7).
2w148 B.R. at 269.
201M. at 271.
202 d. at 271-72.
2031d. at 272. See also In re Roberts, 75 B.R. 402, 406 (D. Utah 1987) (citing client's choice of counsel
and the economic realities as reasons to permit joint representation).
204136 B. at 983.
205M. at 986.
2061ld.2071d.
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There are serious policy ramifications to such a holding...
which auger against deciding the case on that basis. The
cramdown provisions of the Code are an expression of con-
gressional intent regarding the importance of reorganization
values even in the face of considerable creditor opposition,
provided those creditors' interests are appropriately
protected.2
08
The court also noted that a strict application of Kendavis would create an
inevitable in terrorem effect that would discourage competent counsel from
accepting responsibility for such cases in the first place and from diligently
discharging their duties.209
Thus, the widespread use of the principles enunciated in Kendavis is sub-
ject to the cost and normative concerns that limit the effectiveness of the
bankruptcy governance structure. In small cases, courts are reluctant to find
that dual representation constitutes a per se disqualification on the basis of
disinterestedness. In addition, courts are averse to holding that actions of
counsel for the debtor in possession which benefit managers and shareholders
of the debtor necessarily should be taken as an indication that the attorney
has abandoned her broader duty to the estate in favor of a particular group.
This is not to say, however, that an attorney's compensation plays no role
in the bankruptcy governance structure. In contrast to the fairly broad ap-
proach taken in the disinterestedness cases, courts are increasingly examining
attorneys' fees and governance issues in a somewhat more targeted way by
examining how the work provided a benefit to the estate as is required under
§ 330(a)(3)(C).210 These cases require attorneys to exercise independent
judgment regarding the continued viability of a debtor or to risk losing their
fees for work done beyond the point at which the reorganization appears to
be hopeless.211
In re Office Products of America, Inc. provides an example of this ap-
proach. In this case, after concluding that actions by counsel for the debtor in
2O8ld"
20Id. at 988.
21011 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3)(C) (1994) directs the court in reviewing a fee application to consider, among
other things, 'whether the services were necessary to the administration of, or beneficial at the time at
which the service was rendered toward the completion of, a case under this title." In addition, 11 U.S.C.
§ 330(a)(4XA)(ii) (1994) prohibits the court from allowing compensation for services that were not 'rea-
sonably likely to benefit the debtor's estate or that were not "necessary to the administration of the case."
Section 330 was substantially rewritten in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394,
§ 224, 108 Stat. 4106, 4130-3 1. In large part, the change appears simply to codify the lodestar method of
determining attorneys' fees used by many bankruptcy courts.
2 1 1"Chapter 11 cases which lack viable chances of reorganization may place the fees of counsel at risk."
In re Offield, 128 B.R. 548, 550 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991).
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possession did not warrant a finding of disinterestedness,2 12 the court went
on to consider whether the firm's efforts to avoid a conversion of the case
provided a benefit to the estate.213 Again, the court noted that the plan of
reorganization filed by the debtor in an effort to avoid conversion of the case
was unconfirmable,214 and stated that the fee detail filed in the case suggested
.that there was a point in time when the debtor knew or should have known
that pursuit of [the] plan flew in the face of [the plan confirmation stan-
dards] .... "21-5 The court concluded that "[a]t that point, the services of the
counsel were no longer 'necessary." 2 16 The court denied allowance of the
request for $10,315.00 in fees that related to the plan, stating that that work
"served primarily to maintain then-current management in control of the en-
terprise, at significant risk to the creditor body721 7
In Rubner & Kutner, P.C. v. U.S. Trustee (In re Lederman Enterprises,
Inc.),218 the Tenth Circuit made clear that in evaluating fee applications, ben-
efit to the estate is a threshold concern which the court must determine
before conducting any review into the reasonableness of the attorneys'
fees. 219 Lederman involved an appeal of a bankruptcy court order disallowing
attorneys' fees that related to plan confirmation and disclosure. The bank-
ruptcy court held that the debtor's petition was not filed in good faith and,
therefore, that the work did not benefit the estate.220 The firm appealed the
order, arguing that the bankruptcy court erred in treating lack of benefit to
the estate as a basis for denial of all fees related to particular work. Instead,
the firm argued, benefit to the estate is merely a factor that the court should
consider in determining the amount of the fees.221 The Leder-man court also
rejected the firm's argument that the bankruptcy court's denial of compensa-
tion amounted to punishment for the debtor's decision to file the petition,
citing a number of cases in which courts have denied fees for work completed
when it is obvious that there is no reasonable prospect for a successful
2 2 See supra notes 187-209 and accompanying text.
213136 B.R. at 988-91.
2141d at 990.
2151d.
2161d. at 990-91.
2171C at 991.
218997 F.2d 1321 (10th Cir. 1993).
2191d. at 1323.
22°See id. at 1322.
2211d. at 1323. The firm also appealed the bankruptcy court's reduction of its fees based on inadequate
information in the fee application. The district court found that the bankruptcy court erred in imposing a
twenty percent across the board reduction in the fees, and remanded the case for a recalculation of fees.
See Rubner & Kutner, P.C. v. United States Trustee (In re Lederman Enters, Inc.), 143 B.R 772, 775 (D.
Colo. 1992). The district court affirmed the portion of the bankruptcy court's opinion reducing the fees
for lack of benefit to the estate, however. Id
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reorganization. 222
Not all courts have followed the lead of cases such as Lederman and
OPA. These two cases place the counsel for the debtor in possession in a
unique role. Normally when representing a corporation, an attorney is enti-
tled to look to the corporation's management for direction regarding business
judgments. The comments to Rule 1.13 of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct evidence this traditional allocation of authority:
When constituents of the organization make decisions for it,
the decisions ordinarily must be accepted by the lawyer even
if their utility or prudence is doubtful. Decisions concerning
policy and operations, including ones entailing serious risk,
are not as such in the lawyer's province. However, different
considerations arise when the lawyer knows that the organi-
zation may be substantially injured by action of a constituent
that is in violation of law.223
The court in In re Spanjer Bros., Inc.224 cited this commentary in its consider-
ation of a creditors' committee's challenge to the allowance of fees to counsel
for the debtor in possession incurred in the unsuccessful opposition to the
committee's motion for the appointment of a trustee.225 The court noted
that the debtor's management's opposition to the motion was not a violation
of law and therefore it was counsel's duty to follow the instructions of man-
agement and defend against the committee's motion.226
Of course, one cannot take the Model Rules standard of illegality too
literally in the bankruptcy context. It is not illegal to take actions such as
filing plans that violate the absolute priority rule, appealing confirmation or-
ders, or opposing conversion, yet taking such actions may place counsel for
222997 F.2d at 1323-24 (collecting cases). See also In re Ogden Modulars, Inc, 207 B.R. 198 (Bankr.
E.D. Mo. 1997) (denying fees of attorney for opposing the revocation of an order of confirmation); In re
Parke Imperial Canton, Ltd., 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 259, No. 93-61004 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Feb. 27, 1995)
(reducing fees related to the preparation of unconfirmable plan and disclosure statement and appeal of
confirmation of creditor plan); In re Mflex Corp., 172 B.R. 854 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994) (disallowing all
compensation and requiring disgorgement of retainer where counsel filed plan with little chance of confir-
mation and failed to disclose compensation and conflicts of interest); In Te Automobile Warranty Corp.
138 B.R. 72 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991) (fees disallowed for preparation of plan that was filed as delay tactic);
In re S & E Oil Co., Inc, 66 B.R. 6 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986) (reducing fees where it should have been
obvious that reorganization would not succeed).
223MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 cmt.3 (1983). Professor Ayer has noted
that such pronouncements of the ethical obligations of attorneys are based on a litigation model and on a
model of negotiation that includes a basic supposition that a lawyer is a person who tries a case. Ayer,
supra note 109, at 378-84. He further points out that bankruptcy does not fit within the models repre-
sented by the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Model Rules. Id. at 392.
224191 B.R. 738 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996).
2251d. at 751-52.
2261d. at 752.
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the debtor in possession at risk of losing fees if the court determines that the
actions did not benefit the estate. Cases in which courts deny fees on this
basis revolve around the fuzzy standards imposed by the fiduciary principle,
not some hard-edged notion of illegality. Still, cases such as Spanjer remind
us that in examining those fiduciary standards, the Code requires the debtor
in possession, and thus its counsel, to represent all of the interests in the
estate-not just those of creditors seeking a quick liquidation.
Casco Northern Bank, NA. v. DN Associates (In re DN Associates)227
makes clear that this broad duty plays an important role in the determination
of fee disputes. The court rejected a creditor's argument that counsel for the
debtor in possession represented interests that were materially adverse to the
estate. The creditor argued that counsel's opposition to the creditor's plan
and the proposal of three plans under which the limited partners would re-
tain an interest in the reorganized debtor warranted a disallowance of fees.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals quoted the bankruptcy court with ap-
proval, stating that:
[i]t would be unfortunate if courts, looking only at plan pro-
visions removed from context, concluded as a matter of law
that a conflict of interest existed whenever a debtor and its
counsel, in the face of creditor opposition, pursued a reorgan-
ization strategy that, while providing for creditors in a fash-
ion consistent with Chapter 11 priorities, sought to adjust
the rights and relations of parties-in-interest so that the in-
terests of equity interest holders could be preserved.22s
The legitimacy of the equity holders' desire to preserve their interests also
carried over to the court's analysis of how the work benefitted the estate.
The court approved the bankruptcy court's discussion of the intangible bene-
fits the plans provided. Among these benefits was the attempt to protect "all
interested parties, including creditors and debtor's investors" 229 and the con-
structive competition that arose among the plans.230
The ability of debtors to retain counsel willing to undertake such an ex-
pansive role naturally is impaired by the risk that the court will deny fees to
attorneys who err in favor of managers and shareholders. In In re Garrison
Liquors,231 the court noted that a rule that penalized attorneys for failed reor-
ganization efforts "would not merely chill the enthusiasm for debtors' repre-
sentation but would prejudice the bankruptcy system itself by promoting the
2273 F.3d 512 (1st Cir. 1993).
22'Sd. at 516 (quoting In re DN Associates, 144 B.IL 195, 200 (Bankr. D. Me. 1992)).
229Id. at 516.
2 301d.
231108 B.R. 561 (Bankr. D. Md. 1989).
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filing of liquidation cases rather than reorganizations."232 In somewhat
stronger language, the court in In re City Mattress233 rejected the notion that
attorneys should act as watchdogs over the viability of the reorganization,
noting that [I] egal services are the very lifeblood of a debtor in reorganiza-
tion."234 The court seemed to reject the benefit to the estate standard, sub-
stituting instead a good faith requirement stating, "To the extent that a
Chapter 11 debtor is incapable of reorganization, the Trustee's Office may
move for conversion or dismissal. So long as the debtor is permitted to con-
tinue in Chapter 11, however, this court will not penalize counsel for its
good-faith representation. 2
35
These cautionary notes notwithstanding, the trend seems to be to treat
counsel for the debtor in possession as a critical component of the Chapter 11
governance system. The unique nature of debtor practice requires the attor-
ney to monitor continually not only the legal aspects of the case but also the
business decisions made by management. This unique status arises not only
from the broad fiduciary duties owed by the debtor in possession, and thus
by its counsel, but also from purely pragmatic considerations. As the court in
In re Pacific Forest Industries, Inc.236 so aptly pointed out, the governance
structure that Congress envisioned for the Bankruptcy Code does not work
in a world of ever increasing filings. 237 The courts and the United States
Trustee's office are hopelessly overburdened 238 and thus the process must
turn to counsel for the debtor in possession as the one person who is familiar
with both the debtor and the practical constraints on the reorganization
process. 2
39
D. SUMMARY: MAKING THE BEST OF A BAD SITUATION
Bankruptcy courts have shown a remarkable resourcefulness in respond-
232Id. at 564. See also In re James Contracting Group, Inc., 120 B.R1 868, 873 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990)
(stating that "counsel should not be penalized merely for the lack of a successful reorganization").
233174 B.L 23 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1994).
2341d. at 26.
235Id. The City Mattress case did not, however, involve a challenge to the fees of the counsel for the
debtor in possession based on lack of benefit. Instead, the case considered the United States Trustees
challenge to an application for interim compensation.
23695 B.R. 740 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989).
2371d. at 743-44.
238Cf. NBRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 26 (recommending an expansion of the role of the United
States Trustee in small business reorganizations).
239In Pacific Forest Industries, the court examined what counsel for the debtor in possession referred to
as an application to sequester his attorneys fees. The plan called for the monthly payment of attorneys'
fees which counsel would place in his client trust account pending court approval of his fee application. 95
B.R at 741. The attorney argued that attorneys for a debtor in possession should not be forced to finance
the case and risk losing their fees if the reorganization failed. Id. The court noted that the risk of nonpay-
ment provided the attorney an incentive to monitor the debtor in possession and to assure that estate
assets were not wasted in a futile attempt at reorganization. It then denied the application. Id. at 743.
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ing to the problem of governing managerial behavior within a legislative
framework that is theoretically sound but practically unworkable.240
Through active case management, courts have placed outside limits on the
ability of managers and shareholders to delay the ultimate demise of hopeless
debtors. Courts have successfully used examiners to overcome managers
informational advantages and to assist in plan negotiations. Finally, through
their control over fee awards, courts have conscripted attorneys for debtors
in possession into a governance role. Each of these methods are subject to
difficulties that limit their effectiveness, however. The nature of the judicial
role may be inconsistent with some forms of case management. This problem,
combined with concerns over costs, limit the widespread creative use of ex-
aminers. The need to attract high-quality attorneys to debtors' practice, cou-
pled with the inherent conflicts such a practice entails, causes courts to be
reluctant to rely too heavily on counsel for the debtor in possession. On
balance, however, these approaches seem to be reasonably calculated to re-
spond to the intractable problems native to the reorganization process.
IV. THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION
REPORT: PRAGMATISM MEETS POLICY
Established by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,241 the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission has recently completed an exhaustive study
of all aspects of the bankruptcy process. 242 The Commission's 1,000-plus
page Final Report includes more than 170 recommendations covering the
entire range of bankruptcy problems from individual bankruptcies to large
corporate reorganizations. Although, the Commission chose not to draft an
all-encompassing bankruptcy reform bill, perhaps reducing the likelihood of
prompt legislative consideration, it is likely that the Report will dominate
discussions of bankruptcy policy for years to come.
While the Commission's Report recommended a number of changes to
Chapter 11, by far the most significant proposals for changes in the reorgani-
Zation governance structure attempt to address the unique problems of small
business reorganizations. As noted above,243 small business cases not only
dominate Chapter 11,244 but also present unique problems that have led some
commentators to question the wisdom of including large and small cases
-0 Clark, supra note 107, at 200.
24'Pub. L. No. 103-394, §§ 601-610, 108 Stat. 4106, 4147-50.
242The Commission's Report was presented to Congress, the President, and the Chief Justice on Octo-
ber 20, 1997.
7
43See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
2 "The Commission estimated that approximately eighty-five percent of Chapter 11 filings would fall
within the $5,000,000 debt limit that the recommendations use to define "small business:" See supra note
65.
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under the same statutory framework.245 The Commission noted two funda-
mental problems relating to small business Chapter 11's. First, some Chapter
11 requirements are so costly and cumbersome that relief under the chapter is
out of reach for certain businesses wishing to reorganize.246 Thus, the Com-
mission's recommendations included proposals to streamline several Chapter
11 procedures for these cases. Second, the Commission noted that the major-
ity of small businesses seeking relief have no reasonable likelihood of rehabili-
tation.247  With respect to this latter category of cases, the Commission
attempted to craft rules to identify more quickly hopeless debtors and to
move them out of the reorganization process.
Solutions to these two problems create a tension, however. Provisions
that are designed to eliminate those cases languishing in Chapter 11 without
hope of reorganization will necessarily increase the cost of the process. 248
Conversely, cost-cutting and simplification measures carry the risk of reduc-
ing the effectiveness of the governance structure. The Commission's Report
appears sensitive to this tension-generally erring on the side of improved
governance.2
49
A. THE SMALL BUSINESS PROPOSALS
The small business proposals attack the problem of governing these cases
from two directions. First, the proposals provide standards regarding the
debtor in possession's conduct of both the case and the underlying business.
These proposals provide shortened deadlines for both plan filing and confir-
mation and provide that the failure of the debtor to comply with either the
deadlines or a number of other requirements constitute cause for dismissal,
conversion, or the appointment of a trustee. Second, the proposals enhance
24 5See Paskay & Wolstenholme, supra note 67, at 345-56. Compare Clark, supra note 107, at 200
(examining the question, but concluding that well-trained bankruptcy judges can tailor the single chapter
to fit a variety of debtors), with David Arthur Skeel, Jr., Markets, Courts and the Brave New World of
Bankruptcy Theory, 1993 Wis. L. Rnv. 465, 510-517 (1993) (suggesting that Congress should enact sepa-
rate reorganization chapters for public and closely held corporations).
2"NBRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 614.2471d. at 609.
24SSee id. at 640 (noting the additional cost and burden of proposed reporting requirements).
249The principal cost cutting measures will likely have little effect on the governance structure. Pig-
gybacking off of the existing provisions on small business bankruptcies, the proposals eliminate the
mandatory appointment of creditors' committees for a larger number of cases. See 11 U.S.C. § 1 102(a)(1)
(1994). This provision is likely to have a negligible effect on bankruptcy governance, since creditors'
committees are currently appointed in only around fifteen percent of all Chapter 11 cases. The other cost
cutting measure is the proposal to simplify the disclosure requirements by allowing the use of form disclo-
sure statements and allowing courts the discretion to combine the hearing on approval of the disclosure
statement with the confirmation hearing. The Commission noted that small cases cannot support the fees
required to draft the elaborate disclosure statements required under current law. NBRC REPORT, supra
note 6, at 637. It is therefore likely that simplifying the disclosure statement requirements will result in
better disclosure than is currently available.
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oversight of the debtor in possession and the conduct of the case. The pro-
posals expand the reporting requirements, require the court to conduct status
conferences and increase the role of the United States Trustee's office in
overseeing the case. The following discussion examines these approaches in
more detail.
1. Standards of Conduct
The heart of the standards of conduct governing small business reorgani-
zations is the Commission's proposal to amend § 1112(b).250 The proposal
provides particularized benchmarks for the conduct of the business and the
Chapter 11 case and shifts the burden to the debtor to show its entitlement
to continue in Chapter 11 if the benchmarks are not met. Among these
benchmarks are a failure to maintain insurance or to pay taxes or bankruptcy
fees or charges, continued loss to or diminution of the estate, and failure to
file reports in the case or to attend § 341 meetings or Rule 2004 examina-
tions or to comply with the United States Trustee's reasonable requests for
meetings or information. 251 Failure of the debtor in possession to meet these
benchmarks constitutes cause for dismissal, conversion or the appointment of
a trustee. The proposed revisions to § 1112 represent the Commission's at-
tempt both to add teeth to the Code's procedural requirements and to iden-
tify objective factors that have a high correlation with a likelihood of a failed
reorganization.2
52
Where cause is established, the burden shifts to the debtor to show an
entitlement to continue in Chapter 11. Not only must the debtor show that
it is more likely than not that a plan will be confirmed within the time set by
the court, but, if the cause was an act or omission of the debtor, the debtor
must show a reasonable justification for the act or omission and must cure the
problem within thirty days or less if the court so orders.253 The Commis-
sion's Report explains that the intent of this proposal is to adopt a burden of
proof "halfway between existing Chapter 11 practice and the burden of proof
imposed on nondebtor litigants seeking injunctive relief against creditor ac-
tion."254 The proposals continue to place the burden on the party seeking
dismissal or conversion until the debtor fails to meet one of the benchmarks.
At that point, the burden shifts to the debtor to show a likelihood of success.
2
.It is unclear from the text of the recommendations for revision of § 1112 whether the proposal is
intended to apply only to small business reorganizations. The proposal itself recommends a replacement
for 1112(b) which appears to apply to all Chapter 11 cases. NBRC REPoRT, supra note 6, at 30-31. The
Report's discussion of the proposal makes several references to small business cases, however. Id. at 652-
56.
2 "Id. at 31.
252 d. at 653.
2531d at 30.
254Id. at 652-63.
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In addition to the proposed changes to § 1112, the Commission has rec-
ommended shortened deadlines for filing and confirming a plan of reorganiza-
tion. Under the proposal, all plans2 "5 and disclosure statements must be filed
within ninety days and a plan must be confirmed within 150 days. The pro-
posal would permit extensions only if the extension hearing is conducted and
ruled upon within the deadline and only if the debtor proves "by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that it is more likely than not to confirm a plan of
reorganization within a reasonable time."256 The proposal includes a require-
ment that the United States Trustee actively participate in the extension
hearing and requires the court to set a new deadline at the time the extension
is granted.257 While the Commission Report justifies this requirement as a
cost saving measure that is beneficial to the debtor,258 it is perhaps more
appropriately viewed as providing assurance to the creditors that there will
be an outside limit on management's ability to maintain control over the busi-
ness in Chapter 11.
2. Oversight
Of course, these standards would be ineffective to counteract the control
of managers in cases in which no one raises the debtor's failure to meet the
standards. Thus, as a complement to the standards, the Commission's recom-
mendations combine enhanced powers of the United States Trustee, and a
requirement that the court hold at least one "on the record" scheduling con-
ference,2-9 with increased debtor reporting requirements to provide a struc-
ture of oversight of the debtor in possession. These provisions represent the
Commission's effort to counteract the governance problems associated with
creditor apathy in small Chapter 11 cases.
The centerpiece of the Commission's oversight proposal is enhancement
of the role of the United States Trustee. The proposals require the United
States Trustee to conduct an initial debtor interview (IDI) soon after the
initiation of the case. The purpose of the IDI is twofold. First the IDI is
intended to provide debtor education. The proposal requires the United
States Trustee to inform the debtor of its reporting and other obligations
under the Code. Second, the IDI allows the United States Trustee to begin
learning about the debtor's business and likely prospects for reorganization.
25 5The recommendation retains the exclusivity period for the entire ninety days but allows the court
to lift exclusivity. Id. at 28.
2561d. at 29.
2 5 7
1d.
25 1d. at 644.
259Id. at 29. The court may dispense with the scheduling conference if the debtor and the United
States Trustee present an agreed scheduling order to the court for approval on notice and a hearing. I&
The proposals contemplate that, in most cases, such an order will be agreed to at the initial debtor inter-
view. See infra note 260 and accompanying text.
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In addition to the IDI, the United States Trustee is given the authority to
visit the debtor's business premises to examine the debtor's books and
records. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the proposals require the
United States Trustee to review and monitor cases with a view toward iden-
tifying those cases in which the debtor's prospects appear hopeless and to
move for relief under § 1112 where material grounds exist.
260
The Commission's proposed enhancements to the Chapter 11 reporting
requirements are conceptual rather than specific. The proposal calls upon the
Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules to develop nationwide standards
for small business reporting that achieve a balance between reasonably com-
plete information and affordability and simplicity. Elaborating on what con-
stitutes reasonably complete information, the proposal states that the
reporting requirements should, at a minimum, include information regarding
profitability, including projections of receipts and disbursements and a com-
parison of actual versus projected results, and information regarding the
debtor's compliance with the Code's requirements and tax obligations.
261
B. EVALUATION OF THE CO1MISSION'S PROPOSALS
The Commission's proposals obviously draw heavily from the positive
experiences of bankruptcy judges who have used active case management
techniques in an effort to reduce the delay and consequent waste of assets in
small business cases. The oversight function of the United States Trustee
responds directly to the creditor indifference problem that many commenta-
tors have identified in these cases. In addition, the shortened deadlines for
plan filing and confirmation coupled with the changes in the substantive stan-
dards for dismissal or conversion provide creditors with some assurance that
some outside limits are placed on both the length and the breadth of manage-
rial discretion. Overall then, the recommendations represent a positive step
toward improved governance in Chapter 11.
This conclusion is subject to a few caveats, however. The Commission's
general proposals regarding Chapter 11 may limit somewhat the effectiveness
of the small business proposals. By a 5-4 vote, the Commission proposed the
codification of the new value exception (corollary?)262 to the absolute prior-
26ONBRC REPoRT, supra note 6, at 32.
2611d. at 26-27.
2 62Whether the new value rule is an exception or corollary to the absolute priority rule turns on the
appropriate interpretation of § 1129(b)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that, in a
cramdown plan, junior classes may not "receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior claim or
interest any property" unless senior classes are paid in full. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1994) (em-
phasis added). The correct characterization may also turn on which side of the new value debate one finds
him or herself. Compare NBRC REmoRT, supra note 6, at 104 (discussing the Commission's recommenda-
tion to codify the new value "corollary"), with Hon. Edith H. Jones, Dissent from Certain Commission
Recommendations on General Issues in Chapter 11, at 19, published in NBRC REPORT, supra note 6, at
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ity rule263 in all cases, large and small.264 The effect of this proposal on the
governance concerns discussed in this Article is somewhat indirect, but may
be substantial.265 Both the substantive and oversight aspects of the small
business proposals have as their goal the identification of cases in which a
confirmed plan is unlikely. The effort, of course, is to eliminate the ability of
managers and shareholders to use the delays inherent in Chapter 11 to remain
in control of the debtor, and perhaps to extract concessions from the credi-
tors.266 Small business debtors may remain in Chapter 11 beyond the dead-
lines only upon a showing that it is more likely than not that they will
confirm a plan within a reasonable time. To the extent that the new value
rule makes it easier to propose a confirmable plan, the deadlines may lose
some of their effectiveness.2 67
In addition, it may be that the proposals do not go far enough in resolving
the governance problems in small business cases. In its deliberations over
how oversight should be conducted, the Commission considered and rejected
proposals to require the appointment of an independent business expert to
examine the viability of the business and to oversee the debtor's manage-
ment.268 Critics of this approach cited the duplication of functions already
served by the courts, United States Trustees, and panel trustees: the likeli-
hood that such agents would be perceived as "stereotypical government bu-
reaucrats," and, the cost of such professionals.269 In the end the Commission
ch.5 (discussing the Commission's proposal to codify a new value "exception7). The dissenting views of
the individual Commissioners are available via the Internet at <hIttp://www.nbrc.gov/report/
24commvi.pdf>.
26 3
NBRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 24.
26 4In fact, the Report makes specific reference to the needs of "mom and pop" businesses in its new
value discussion. See id. at 564.
26 5The proposal does, however, include a provision terminating the debtor's exclusive right to propose
a plan on motion by a party in interest when the debtor moves to confirm a nonconsensual new value plan.
Id. at 24. This aspect of the proposal ameliorates somewhat the imbalance created by granting the debtor
an exclusive option to propose such a plan. Id. at 562. The lifting of exclusivity may not be sufficient,
however, to counteract the negotiating leverage created by the ability to delay the case by proposing a
new value plan and the informational advantage held by the debtor's management. See Jones, supra note
262, at 24-27 (pointing out the inadequate protection provided by competing plans).
s The NBRC Report recognizes the concern that the ability of equity to propose a new value plan
may create additional opportunities for equity to exercise "hold-out leverage but concludes that 'in the
context of the widely held publically traded debtor, this proposal is unlikely to change negotiating posi-
tions based on hold-out powers." NBRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 565. The Report does not respond to
this concern in the context of smaller cases.
26 7See Jones, supra note 262, at 28 (arguing that the proposal undercuts the small business proposals).
Judge Jones also argues that the proposal does not include the requirements for new value contributions
set out in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber, 308 U.S. 106 (1939), and may overrule the Supreme Court's
holding in Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988). Id. at 23. These deficiencies would
make it even easier to confirm a new value plan.
26 SNBRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 658. The Report refers to the success of such an approach in the
United Kingdom. Id.2691d. at 658-59.
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decided to allocate this function to the United States Trustees.
The Report's discussion of this decision provides an unsatisfactory expla-
nation. Duplication is a function of the allocation of authority. Presumably,
the presence of an independent monitoring agent would alleviate the govern-
ance burden placed on others in the process. 270 Furthermore, it is unclear
what problems are created by a perception that the monitor is a bureaucrat.
Even if such a perception would create difficulties, it is unlikely that the
perception of a monitoring agent as a "stereotypical government bureaucrat"
is reduced by the allocation of oversight authority to a governmental entity.
The Commission's reference to the cost of an additional professional in
the case raises what is perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the small busi-
ness proposals. While the Report uses cost as a means of justifying its deci-
sion not to use an independent monitoring agency, the Report is nearly
devoid of any discussion of the likely cost of the expanded duties allocated to
the United States Trustee. The only reference to the cost of expanding the
duties of the United States Trustee is a brief passage expressing concern over
whether Congress will appropriate the necessary funds for the United States
Trustee to fulfill its new role.271
Of course, inadequate funding would cripple the oversight provisions.
The problem with the Commission's approach to the cost issue is more fun-
damental, however. Increasing oversight comes only at a cost-no matter
whether the role is assigned to a governmental or to a private entity. It may
be that the United States Trustee can perform this role more efficiently than
can a private monitoring agent, but the Report provides no evidence that this
is true. Aside from the relative efficiency of government versus private
monitors, there is the question of who should bear the cost of oversight. By
assigning the oversight role to the United States Trustee, the proposal places
this burden on the government, creating an additional subsidy for the reor-
ganization process. Such a subsidy may be defensible in light of the public
benefits of the reorganization process. At a minimum, however, the question
raises substantial policy issues that the Report's treatment of the cost issue
obscures.
C. THE COMMISSION PROPOSALS AND THE CONTINUED DEBATE
OVER THE GoALs of CHAPTER 11
Like most of the Commission's recommendations, the small business pro-
posals are not entirely free of controversy. Two of the Commissioners dis-
sented from the small business proposals noting that "the Commission's
2 '°0 n addition, the Reports reference to a duplication of the panel trustees function is somewhat
mystifying.
17 1NBRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 657.
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Recommendation sets up a requirement-laden, inflexible program aimed pri-
marily at removing cases from the system that cannot confirm plans in the
limited time permitted."272 The dissent cites the benefits of Chapter 11 to
employees, customers and suppliers, and taxing authorities, and argues that
the proposals would make those benefits more difficult to achieve.273 In its
conclusion, the dissent states, quite clearly, the deep-seated policy issues that
the proposals raise:
The Recommendation thus reveals an unmistakable sense
that it is not the failing business lingering aimlessly in Chap-
ter 11 that is the target so much as it is Chapter 11 itself. If
that is the message of the Recommendation, then a more fun-
damental debate about Chapter 11 must be resolved-or at
least the clear policy choices identified-before large scale
case management proposals can be realistically considered.2
74
These Commissioners' comments illustrate a point made earlier. There
exists no clear consensus regarding the appropriate goals of Chapter 11.275
This lack of consensus surfaces elsewhere in the Report and in the dissents.
In her dissent from the Chapter 11 proposals, Commission Member Judge
Jones complained that the majority's proposals included a number of unstated
assumptions that include the debtor's need for added negotiating leverage and
control and that there are too few cases with confirmed plans. 276 She further
expressed concern that there was a lack of attention paid to "concrete pro-
posals to get the creditors paid more quickly and certainly. 277 Sharply di-
vided votes on proposals such as the new value recommendation may simply
reflect differences of opinion regarding the appropriate means to an agreed
end. It is more likely, however, that the differing views reflect a more funda-
mental disagreement on the appropriate ends.
A common refrain in discussions of Chapter 11 is that it is intended to
rehabilitate businesses -for the benefit of both debtors and creditors [and] to
preserve jobs and other ties within communities."278 Successful reorganiza-
tions can do both. But this well-worn maxim obscures an important fact-
the separate goals of benefitting creditors and saving jobs and ties within
communities conflict anytime the business has a liquidation value that ex-
272Babette Ceccotti & Hon. Robert Ginsberg, Dissent From Recommendation Regarding Small Busi-
ness Chapter 11 Cases, at 7, published in NBRC REPoR-T, supra note 6, at ch.5.
273
See id. at 2-3.
274Id. at 3.
275See supra notes 71-82 and accompanying text.
276Jones, supra note 262, at 1222.
277 d. at 1223.
2 78NBRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 566-67.
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ceeds its value as a going concern.279 These are the cases that present the
most fundamental policy questions regarding the goals of Chapter 11. The
Commission's Report shows that the resolution of such questions will con-
tinue to undergird the debate over bankruptcy reform.
CONCLUSION
In theory, the problem of controlling managerial behavior in Chapter 11
presents no real challenge. Chapter 11 provides a structure of investor repre-
sentation and judicial oversight that facially addresses the governance
problems inherent in running an insolvent corporation. By looking to the
principles of financial economics that support and illuminate the nonban-
kruptcy governance structure, analysts have developed a number of sugges-
tions regarding ways to apply nonbankruptcy governance principles in
Chapter 11 to assure that managerial decisions maximize the value of the
business assets.
The theoretical solutions to governance problems in Chapter 11 do not
provide answers in the real world, however. Small bankruptcies present
unique governance problems that arise from the fact that creditors do not
individually have enough at stake to justify monitoring the debtor's manage-
ment and challenging actions that do not maximize the value of the debtor's
assets. The most fundamental of such actions relate to efforts to continue an
attempt at reorganization that appears, to an objective observer, to be hope-
less., A delay in liquidation may place creditor recoveries at risk in an effort
that may only benefit shareholders and managers. Bankruptcy courts have
developed three somewhat related approaches to combat managerial auton-
omy in these cases. Through active case management, the flexible use of ex-
aminers, and control over the fees of counsel for the debtor in possession,
some courts have attempted to counteract managerial autonomy. The Na-
tional Bankruptcy Review Commission has incorporated some of these ap-
proaches in its proposals for reform of the provisions governing small business
bankruptcies.
But lurking under the surface of the both the cases and the Commission's
Report is a more fundamental problem-a lack of consensus regarding the
goals of Chapter 11. Everyone can agree on what we want bankruptcy to
do-it should rehabilitate companies in order to maximize creditor returns,
preserve jobs, and assure continuing support for communities surrounding the
business. Sometimes Chapter 11 can do this, but most of the time it cannot.
The question is not whether we should save the businesses that can be saved
and quickly liquidate the rest, however. It is instead a question of in which
direction the process should err. Since our approach to governance will nec-
'79See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
1998)
156 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 72
essarily have an effect on the direction of error, it is unlikely that a fully
functioning governance structure will emerge until this fundamental question
is answered.
